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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 5THE NEW YORK TIMES
6 November 1978PURSUIT OF SPY CASE
BY C.I.A. QUESTIONEDAgency Reportedly Knew Soviets
Had Secrets Before It Came
to Suspect Ex-Employee

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 5 — The Central Intelligence Agency learned that information on its highly secret KH-11 satellite reconnaissance system was in the hands of the Soviet Union more than two months before it came to suspect William P. Kampiles, the man charged with selling the secrets, according to senior intelligence sources.

The sources said in interviews that this fact severely complicated the espionage prosecution of Mr. Kampiles in two ways.

First, they said, the Government must consider dropping the case if the manner in which the C.I.A. received the information could come out in court proceedings.

Moreover, the sources said, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was already investigating the disclosure of information on the KH-11 system when its attention was drawn to Mr. Kampiles, a former C.I.A. clerical employee. There is some doubt whether F.B.I. agents who first contacted Mr. Kampiles in August told him that he was a suspect, and this could affect the Government's case against him.

Mr. Kampiles, 23 years old, goes on trial tomorrow in Hammond, Ind., on charges of selling a top-secret manual on the KH-11 system to a Soviet agent in Athens on March 2. He has pleaded not guilty.

Test on Prosecution

The trial is regarded as a crucial test of whether the Government can prosecute espionage cases without having additional national security matters exposed in the course of court proceedings.

In a perjury prosecution of an official of the International Telephone and Telegraph Company here, the Government this week is expected to ask an appeals court to order certain evidence and trial procedure changes to protect what it maintains is national security information. It is expected to take similar steps for the Kampiles case.

Michael D. Monico, a Chicago lawyer 12413 Blueberries D 08-11 00338 NO MORE change for \$3,100.

It was shortly after the second meeting that the C.I.A. learned that its system had been compromised, according to intelligence sources.

Wrote to C.I.A.

In May, Mr. Kampiles allegedly wrote to a former colleague at the C.I.A. and told how he had been in contact and had received money from a Soviet intelligence agent. Mr. Kampiles had worked for the C.I.A. as a "watch officer," a low-ranking clerical position, from March until November 1977.

He reportedly joined the agency in hopes of becoming an intelligence officer and resigned after he was told that the C.I.A. felt he did not have an aptitude for the job and would not put him into a training program as an operative.

He wrote the letter, one source suggested, in the hope that it would show his former employers that he had done intelligence work on his own and was now in a position to feed "disinformation" to the Soviet Union and thus become an intelligence operative.

The agency reported the letter to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and F.B.I. agents allegedly met with Mr. Kampiles on two occasions. In the first session he reportedly gave them a statement admitting that he had taken the manual while he was at the C.I.A. and sold it to the Russians.

Question of Warnings

It is unclear from available information whether Mr. Kampiles was warned in that interview that he was a suspect and that he had the right to remain silent or to have a lawyer present. Mr. Kampiles's lawyer will say only that the first time his client was represented by counsel was after his arrest on Aug. 17.

The trial comes at a time of considerable debate on how to prevent disclosure of national security information. Admiral Stansfield Turner, the director of central intelligence, and William Webster, the director of the F.B.I., have said in recent speeches that this is possibly the most serious matter facing the United States intelligence apparatus.

Many civil libertarians, however, fear that the intelligence services are trying to build what one lawyer called a "scare case" as a basis to impose new information restrictions and to change the very nature of public trial in the United States.

Article appeared
on page A-5

THE WASHINGTON POST
6 November 1978

**Around
The Nation**

CIA Spy Trial Begins

HAMMOND, Ind. — A former Central Intelligence Agency employee goes on trial today accused of selling the secrets of an American spy satellite to the Russians.

William Kampiles, 23, allegedly stole a CIA manual on one of the most sophisticated U.S. surveillance satellites and passed it to a Soviet agent in Athens for \$3,000.

Kampiles, once a watch officer at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., was arrested last August in nearby Gary, Ind., and was indicted by a grand jury here.

The CIA and Pentagon have been embarrassed by what has become known as the Kampiles Affair, especially over questions about how such a low-ranking agency employee supposedly got hold of a top-secret document.

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)

7 November 1978

Article appeared
on page A-1, 6

CIA Knew Soviets Had Data Before It Had Theft Suspect

New York Times News Service

The CIA learned that information on its highly secret KH-11 satellite reconnaissance system was in the hands of the Soviet Union more than two months before it came to suspect William P. Kampiles, the man charged with selling the secrets, according to senior intelligence sources.

The sources said in interviews that this fact severely complicated the espionage prosecution of Kampiles in two ways.

First, they said, the government must consider dropping the case if the manner in which the CIA received the information could come out in the proceedings.

Moreover, the sources said, the FBI already was investigating the disclosure of information on the KH-11 system when its attention was drawn to Kampiles, a former CIA clerical employee.

There is some doubt whether FBI agents who first contacted Kampiles in August told him that he was a suspect, and this could affect the government's case against him.

THE JURY WAS selected yesterday for the trial in Hammond, Ind., of Kampiles, 23, who is charged with selling a top-secret manual on the KH-11 system to a Soviet agent in Athens on March 2 for \$3,100. Kampiles, who lives in Munster, Ind., has pleaded not guilty.

Kampiles' lawyer said during a recess in questioning of prospective jurors that the government cannot account for 13 other copies of the manual so that it is possible that someone else stole it and sold it to other foreign countries.

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In a perjury prosecution of an official of the International Telephone and Telegraph Co. here, the government this week is expected to ask an appeals court to order certain evidence and trial procedure changes to protect what it maintains is national security information. The govern-

ment is expected to take similar steps for the Kampiles case.

In May, Kampiles allegedly wrote to a former colleague at the CIA and told how he had been in contact and had received money from a Soviet intelligence agent. Kampiles had worked for the CIA as a "watch officer," a low-ranking clerical position, from March until November 1977.

HE REPORTEDLY joined the agency in hopes of becoming an intelligence officer and resigned after he was told that the CIA felt he did not have the aptitude for the job and would not put him into a training program as an operative.

He wrote the letter, one source suggested, in the hope that it would show his former employers that he had done intelligence work on his own and was now in a position to feed "disinformation" to the Soviet Union and thus become an intelligence operative.

The agency reported the letter to the FBI, and FBI agents allegedly met with Kampiles on two occasions. In the first session he reportedly gave them a statement admitting that he had taken the manual while he was at the CIA and sold it to the Russians.

It was unclear from available information whether Kampiles was warned in that interview that he was a suspect and that he had the right to remain silent or to have a lawyer present. Kampiles' lawyer will say only that the first time his client was represented by counsel was after his arrest on Aug. 17.

The trial comes at a time of considerable debate on how to prevent disclosure of national security information. CIA Director Stansfield Turner and FBI Director William Webster have said in recent speeches that this possibly is the most serious matter facing the U.S. intelligence apparatus.

Many civil libertarians, however, fear that the intelligence services are trying to build what one lawyer called a "scare case" as a basis to impose new information restrictions and to change the nature of public trial in the United States.

Article appeared
on page A-1, 8

13 Copies Of Classified Data Missing

U.S. Disclosure Made at Start of Kampiles Trial

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

HAMMOND, Ind.— The spy trial of former Central Intelligence Agency officer William Kampiles opened here yesterday with the government's acknowledgement that at least 13 other copies of the secret handbook on spy satellites he allegedly sold the Soviet Union are missing.

The Justice Department also admitted in pretrial documents filed yesterday morning that it had not made an inventory of the outstanding copies of the manual until after Kampiles' arrest here in mid-August.

Appearing calm in court and casually dressed in a youthfully tailored sports jacket, Kampiles, 23, stands accused of espionage assertedly for handing the Soviets one of the CIA's numbered copies of a top secret manual describing the capabilities of the sophisticated KH11 spy satellite.

According to the government, Kampiles, a former CIA watch officer, did "injury" to the United States by delivering the manual to a Soviet agent named Michael for \$3,000 during a trip last winter to Athens, Greece.

U.S. District Judge Phil McNagney began the trial at the federal court house here with quick questioning of more than 40 prospective jurors. A panel of eight women and four men backed up by three alternates was chosen by mid-afternoon.

Kampiles' chief defense counsel, Michael D. Monico, told reporters that the government had just informed them 13 copies of the KH11 manual "cannot be accounted for at this time."

One of the themes of Kampiles' defense has been to suggest that he may have been a setup for some unknown master spy or "mole" in a key position at the CIA or another strategically placed government agency.

THE WASHINGTON POST
7 November 1978

U.S. attorney David T. Ready has insisted in pretrial pleadings that the government has no information "regarding the possibility that the Soviet Union gained its knowledge of the KH11 satellite from a source other than the defendant."

Ready admitted that "other suspects were developed in this investigation" but he said that the investigation of those suspects proved fruitless. He refused to give the defense any further information concerning that aspect of the investigation on grounds of privacy and potential compromise of "sensitive national security information."

In a 10-minute opening statement, Ready made clear that the government's case is based heavily on "the defendant's own admissions" to the FBI in August. The government prosecutor charged that Kampiles stole copy No. 155 of the KH11 manual that belonged to the CIA Operations Center where Kampiles worked sometime last year and later took it home with him to Chicago "where he cut off the 'Top Secret' markings."

Frustrated in his hopes of becoming a CIA officer in Greece, Kampiles left the agency in November 1977. He later sold the manual on a trip to Athens where he had "a number of secret and clandestine meetings" with a Soviet military attache named Michael Zavali, the jurors were told.

Kampiles told the agent that he "needed money badly" and finally settled on a price of \$3,000, the U.S. attorney said. Ready maintained that the fact that 13 copies—out of 350 printed in late 1967—were still missing "in the intelligence community . . . will not hamper the government's case."

The defense produced a more dramatic account.

Far from being "a traitor," Kampiles, according to his lawyer, had simply been acting out a dream that the CIA had denied him, seizing on an unexpected opportunity to play double agent in Athens and beat the Soviets "at their own game."

As Monico told it, Kampiles walked around Athens' Constitution Square last February after a night on the town and noticed what seemed to be a party in a nearby building—the Soviet embassy as it turned out.

"He had a crazy notion, a wild and unbelievable notion," Monico declared. "He wanted to test himself, to test his fantasies and dreams so he walked in. It was the worst decision he had ever made in his life up to that point."

In any case, the jurors were told, Kampiles marched up to the embassy's bar, and tried to convince those present he was still with the CIA and had secrets they would want to have.

"His brain was pounding," Monico explained. "Here was Bill Kampiles in the Russian embassy doing exactly what he'd always wanted to do . . . he thought he could return to the United States, be accepted [by the CIA], and return to Greece as an undercover agent."

After three visits and much talk about strategic missiles and the B1 bomber, Kampiles got \$3,000 in exchange for nothing but promises, the lawyer said.

Monico denied that Kampiles had sold any manual to the Soviets and scornfully suggested that the CIA keep looking for the 13 copies that are missing.

"Perhaps if we wait long enough, they'll find No. 155 and then we can all go home," Monico said.

After returning to the United States last March, according to his lawyer, Kampiles met with an old colleague from the CIA, George Johannides, and told him what had happened as they chatted outside agency headquarters in Langley, Va. beside a statue of Nathan Hale.

By Monico's account, Johannides was impressed by Kampiles' ideas of feeding the Soviets "disinformation" and called experts from the CIA's Soviet sector. However, it was near quitting time on a Friday afternoon so Johannides was told to have Kampiles to write it down "in a letter."

Kampiles did that and also sent along a coded note "Michael" had given him to use on a projected return trip to Athens in August, Monico said. But instead, Kampiles was called to Washington Aug. 14 where he was questioned one day by a four-member team of CIA and FBI experts and the next day by one FBI man, James Murphy who apparently broke him down.

Faced with the problem of defending Kampiles' admissions to the FBI, Monico contended that the statements that had been extracted were not true.

"He [Murphy] had learned Bill's vulnerability," Monico asserted, citing for instance, the fact that Kampiles had put the \$3,000 in a joint account with his 63-year-old mother.

"He [Murphy] told Bill if he didn't change his story, his mother would be implicated, his relatives in Greece would be implicated . . . Bill Kampiles is a young, patriotic boy that got involved in a bizarre notion . . . they turned him into a criminal."

The government will start presenting its witnesses today. The trial is expected to last two weeks.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 6THE BALTIMORE SUN
7 November 1978

U.S. missing 13 sky-spy manuals

Hammond, Ind. (Reuter)—The United States government disclosed yesterday that 13 copies of a secret manual on America's spy satellite system were missing.

The disclosure came at the start of the trial of William Kampiles, a former Central Intelligence Agency officer who is accused of selling one of the manuals to the Russians for \$3,000.

David Ready, a U.S. attorney, told a court in the industrial city of Hammond that the manual detailed the technical data of the sophisticated KH-11 satellite reconnaissance system—called the "Big Bird."

He said the high-powered photo surveillance system was used by U.S. intelligence to gather information on troop movements in foreign countries, missile sites and other strategic military installations.

Mr. Ready said 370 copies of the manual were printed in late 1976. A murmur went through the crowded courtroom when he added that 13 copies were still unaccounted for.

Mr. Kampiles's lawyer, Michael Monaco, a former government prosecutor, said he was told last week that 17 copies of the manual were missing.

"If we wait long enough, the copy which Kampiles is accused of passing to the Russians might turn up," he declared.

The prosecution alleged that Mr. Kampiles, 23-year-old son of a Greek immigrant steelworker, pocketed the manual while working at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., between March and November, 1977.

Mr. Ready charged that Mr. Kampiles handed the manual over in two sections to a Russian agent in Athens between February 23 and March 2 for \$3,000.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 64NEWSWEEK
13 NOVEMBER 1978

Cases of 'Graymail'

After CIA employee William P. Kampiles was arrested last August on charges that he sold a classified manual to the Russians for \$3,000, Federal prosecutors quickly built what they consider to be a strong case against him. They have a compromising letter that Kampiles allegedly wrote to a former CIA colleague, some statements that he made to the FBI and, according to court records, an incriminating lie-detector test. But to convict Kampiles, who goes on trial this week in Hammond, Ind., the government may have to pay a very high price: introduce key parts of the classified manual as evidence, possibly giving away more secrets to more people than Kampiles is accused of doing himself.

The Kampiles case is a classic example of a growing legal dilemma: how to guarantee a fair public trial while safeguarding the sensitive national-security information that may be involved. Federal prosecutors often find that they cannot in-

has asked Federal Judge Phil McNaghy for a private hearing to show why some of the sensitive material is irrelevant. Such a procedure was recently recommended by the Senate intelligence committee. But defense lawyer Michael Monico objects to some of the proposed deletions because, he says, they may "bear on the question of innocence or guilt." At the weekend, Judge McNaghy had not decided whether to hold a private hearing to determine the admis-



Sylvain Jullienne—Sygma

Berrellez (left) and Allen-
de: A charge of perjury



UPI

introduce classified evidence essential to win their case. And the government is even more concerned about making national-security information available to defense lawyers, who may need it to represent their clients. Aware of the government's dilemma, some defense lawyers are resorting to a practice called "graymail"—a blanket request for classified information, relevant or not, in the hope that the threat of public disclosure will force the government to drop its case. "They fish around for something that would be so sensitive we couldn't disclose it," says one Justice Department official.

Deletions: In the Kampiles case, Justice Department lawyers admit the government is so eager for a conviction that it may be willing to risk a security breach. "You cannot be in a position of losing credibility with the courts by putting in flimsy evidence," says one official. The government has proposed a few deletions from the manual, and it

sibility of some of the evidence.

That same kind of protective order was sought last week by Assistant Attorney General Philip Heymann in the prosecution of Robert Berrellez, an International Telephone and Telegraph Co. executive who is accused of perjury, conspiracy and obstruction of government proceedings. In 1973, Berrellez told a Senate subcommittee that ITT did not offer money to opponents of Chile's Marxist President Salvador Allende at the request of the CIA. Berrellez reportedly had many CIA contacts and the government now fears that his lawyers might reveal "sources and methods" still used by the CIA in Chile. "If part of a legitimate defense will necessitate the disclosure of information that the government must keep secret, that is the government's problem," says defense attorney Patrick Wall.

The fair trial versus national security problem is further compounded when the case involves foreign intelligence

agencies—as in the upcoming trial of three former FBI officials, acting director L. Patrick Gray, acting associate director W. Mark Felt and assistant director Edward S. Miller. All three have been charged with ordering illegal and unauthorized break-ins by FBI agents at the homes of friends and relatives of fugitive Weatherman radicals in 1972 and 1973. Miller's attorney, Thomas Kennelly, has requested access to all FBI, Justice Department and White House files on contacts between Weathermen and foreign governments or their agents. The law governing entry without

a court order was fuzzy at the time, and Kennelly hopes to show that national security was at stake, thereby justifying the break-ins. "The Weatherman investigation had at least as many foreign national-security aspects as many other cases in which the government has attempted to justify" similar break-ins, says Kennelly.

Compromise: Justice, under court order, turned over the FBI's own files to Kennelly, but said it could not give some documents without the permission of the other law-enforcement and intelligence agencies—both foreign and domestic—that originated them. It offered to provide a written summary of the documents, but Kennelly rejected the compromise. If the courts back him up, the government may have to drop the case.

Some congressmen have suggested that the government try sensitive cases partially in secret to protect critical evidence. But the Justice Department has rejected the idea, saying that it cannot jeopardize a defendant's right to a public trial. Under Attorney General Griffin Bell, Justice is prosecuting many more sensitive cases than ever before, and Bell is determined not to drop them. "There is no immunity that comes with the threat of exposing sensitive matter," he says. Still, a genuine dilemma often does exist, and in many cases the government has to decide whether prosecution is worth the disclosure that would inevitably result.

—DAVID M. ALPERN with ELAINE SHANNON in Washington



AP Photo

Felt and Kampiles: How much disclosure?

THE WASHINGTON POST
8 November 1978

Article appeared
on page A-1, 12

CIA Cold-Shouldered Kampiles, Court Told

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

HAMMOND, Ind.—The 50-drachma ticket, apparently to some Greek sporting event, was dutifully enclosed with a letter William Kampiles sent to the Central Intelligence Agency last May 23.

Jotted down on the back of the ticket, ostensibly in the handwriting of the Soviet agent who was trying to enlist him, was the address of a proposed summertime rendezvous in Athens.

"If you think there might be Agency interest," Kampiles wrote to an old CIA colleague in the accompanying letter, "I would be willing to discuss this experience in full detail."

The letter was written, a U. S. District Court jury was told here yesterday, only because CIA experts on the Soviet bloc had refused to talk to Kampiles last April — despite the fact that all they would have had to do was walk downstairs where he was waiting.

The chief expert on Soviet affairs who was contacted reportedly said talking to Kampiles might be "improper" because he was an American citizen.

Told to write a letter instead, Kampiles sent it to a colleague at the CIA who promptly put it in his briefcase and left it there — unopened — for some two months.

The testimony about the CIA bungling, which unfolded at Kampiles' espionage trial, came not from the defense but from the first witness for the government, a CIA official named George Joannides. It was his belated opening of the Kampiles letter in late July that apparently led to the young man's indictment.

Accused of selling a top-secret manual of the KHLI spy satellite to his Soviet contact, Kampiles has denied it, maintaining through his lawyer that he was simply trying to revive a frustrated dream by playing double agent in Athens on a trip there last winter.

A senior CIA official who had befriended Kampiles in his shortlived career at the agency in 1977, Joannides testified that Kampiles told him about the trip — and his dickering with the Soviets in Athens — as they sat on a bench outside CIA headquarters on April 29, 1978, the last Friday of the month.

According to Joannides, Kampiles told him of crashing a party at the Soviet Embassy in Athens one night last February and striking up an acquaintance there with a Russian named "Michael."

Kampiles, 23, who had earlier expressed a desire to work in Greece for the CIA, told Joannides that he convinced the Russian he was still with the Agency by showing him some sort of "identity documents" that Kampiles said he had once used as a CIA watch officer.

"A reference was made to Mr. Kampiles returning to Greece in late summer," Joannides recalled. He said that Kampiles also told him that "Michael" had given Kampiles an address in Athens where he could be contacted.

"Mr. Kampiles indicated he was playing the Soviets along," Joannides related. "He also stated he had received \$3,000 from the Soviets."

On hearing all that, Joannides, who worked in the CIA office of legal counsel, said he told Kampiles he ought to be talking to someone from the Soviet sector of the Agency. He said Kampiles agreed to wait, on the bench, near a statue of Nathan Hale, while Joannides went back inside to try to find someone to whom he could give all the details.

The witness identified the Soviet-bloc expert only as a man named "Ron." But in any case, Joannides said that "Ron" not only declined to come down and talk to Kampiles. He also declined to send a colleague.

"He stated the reason was the Executive Orders [governing the CIA.] He said that it might be improper for the Agency to be contacting a 'U.S. person,'" Joannides testified.

An executive order issued by President Carter last year lays down some restrictions for the domestic "surveillance" of U.S. persons, but contains no prohibitions against such voluntary interviews. A CIA spokesman declined yesterday to comment on the Kampiles case because "it is still in litigation." But he said he was not aware of any restrictions in the executive order prohibiting CIA officials from talking to American citizens.

Joannides indicated that he argued briefly with the expert and emphasized that "Mr. Kampiles had been in touch with the Soviets in Athens . . . that he might be a 'U.S. person' but he was a former Agency employee who had come forward" and who might be able to identify "Michael" from CIA photos.

Unable to make any headway, Joannides said, he finally suggested that Kampiles might write a letter to the Agency instead and "Ron" agreed.

Joannides said he then went back outside and simply told Kampiles that "it was late Friday afternoon and I couldn't get anyone down to see him." He said Kampiles agreed to write a letter.

Back in Chicago, where he was living, Kampiles finally sent the promised letter to the Soviet Embassy recounting his visit to Joannides at his home in Potomac on May 23. He said that in subsequent meetings with Michael "we then discussed the use of a camera and his role in delivering the information," Kampiles continued. "We set the date for our next meeting during the last two weeks in August. The address, Michael gave me is enclosed in the original form," he said, referring to the 50 drachma ticket.

An owl-like looking man with horn-rimmed glasses, Joannides, who has been recovering from a heart attack said he remembered getting the letter at his home and then sticking it in a zippered briefcase that he took to the office along with doctor bills and insurance forms.

Blaming changes in assignments and status in the CIA, where he is now a part-time employee, Joannides said, "I never addressed myself to the briefcase until late July." Only then did he open the envelope with Kampiles' return address on it.

Joannides said he then turned the letter over to the CIA's Soviet section, and at the request of an official there, Vivian Sacos, he called Kampiles to ask him to come to Washington to discuss the matter.

Kampiles agreed but said he was due to go to Athens on Aug. 18. He said he would try to make arrangements to come to Washington before then and promised to call Joannides back.

When he did, Joannides recalled, it was once again Friday afternoon at the CIA and "my secretary erroneously refused to put it through, saying I was in conference." Joannides said he rectified the mistake by calling Kampiles back and confirming details of his subsequent trip to Washington, including interviews with FBI and CIA officials.

Kampiles finally went back to Munster, Ind., where the FBI arrested him on Aug. 17, the day before his projected trip to Athens.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 5CHICAGO TRIBUNE
8 November 1978

CIA official says Kampiles told him of Russian contact

By John O'Brien

AN OFFICIAL OF the Central Intelligence Agency testified Tuesday in Hammond that William Peter Kampiles, a 23-year-old Chicagoan on trial for espionage, had reported to him of a secret meeting with Soviet agents in which they paid him \$3,000.

George Joannidds, a member of the CIA's office of legislative council, a former friend of Kampiles, and the first prosecution witness in the trial, said he met with Kampiles last April on a bench in the shadow of a statue of Nathan Hale outside CIA headquarters in Langley, Va.

"He [Kampiles] told of going to the Russian Embassy [in Athens] and having a drink," Joannidds told a jury of eight women and four men hearing the case before United States District Judge Phil McNagry. "He said the Soviets had taken an interest in him."

JOANNIDDS, QUESTIONED by prosecutor James Richmond, said Kampiles told him that he had passed himself off as a U.S. government economics analyst and that one of the Russians, identified as Michael Zavali, a presumed agent of the Russian espionage arm, the KGB, later took Kampiles to an Athens nightclub for more talks.

But, Joannidds said, "He [Kampiles] indicated to me that he was only playing the Soviets along and had received \$3,000 from them."

The prosecution contends that the money was paid to Kampiles in return for turning over a CIA manual describing in detail the plans and purpose of a sophisticated U.S. spy satellite that had been



William Kampiles.

in use for about a year or two to monitor troop movements and the location of Soviet missiles.

KAMPILES, ONCE a clerk with the CIA who quit the agency in November, 1977, reportedly urged Joannidds to contact the CIA's Russian squad in an effort to put Kampiles in touch with that part of the CIA.

Joannidds said he did as requested, but an agent on the squad told him he didn't think the agency wanted to get involved with Kampiles because Kampiles was no longer employed by the agency.

"What should I do?" Joannidds said he asked the agent. He said a long silence followed, after which he asked if

Kampiles should write a letter to someone about "the Athens episode."

"That will be fine," Joannidds quoted the CIA agents as saying.

JOANNIDDS READ part of the letter in court. In the letter Kampiles said he was walking through Athens when he stumbled on a Russian embassy party and decided to join it.

"I decided to play a little game with these Russians," Kampiles wrote. In reference to Zavali, the letter continued: "He was pumping me for information. I knew what he was leading up to, but decided to play the naive role. We discussed a camera in the role of delivering information."

Kampiles was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on Aug. 71, one day before he reportedly intended to return to Athens and meet with Russian agents in his self-styled role as U.S. agent.

IN OPENING statements on Monday, Kampiles' attorney, Michael Monaco, said that Kampiles and Zavali had worked out a code. Monaco said that if Kampiles decided to return to Greece for further talks, he was to send a letter to Zavali reading: "Dear Michael—Happy birthday. I am well." If he decided not to return, he would send a message reading: "I am not well."

After his arrest, the defense said, Kampiles voluntarily repeated to the FBI the same disclosures made earlier to the CIA's Joannidds.

The prosecution disclosed during its opening statement on Monday that 12 other copies of the manual Kampiles is accused of selling are unaccounted for.

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NEW YORK TIMES
8 NOVEMBER 1978

Letter by Spy Suspect Neglected

HAMMOND, Ind., Nov. 7 (UPI) — An employee of the Central Intelligence Agency who says he dreamed of becoming a full-fledged spy for the agency and who is now being tried as a spy for the Soviet Union wrote about his contacts with the Russians in a letter to his superiors, but the letter went unopened for two months, an agency official says.

William P. Kampiles, 23 years old, of Munster, Ind., is charged with selling the Soviet Union a secret manual about a United States spy satellite. He faces six counts of espionage and theft of Government property. Two of the spy charges carry life prison terms.

His attorney said Mr. Kampiles had merely been trying to move up from his routine C.I.A. job. And George Joannides, 28, the Government's first witness, testified that a mutual friend told him about Mr. Kampiles in April and that they met shortly afterward to discuss Mr. Kampiles's career ambitions.

Mr. Kampiles was told to write a letter about his February dealings with some Russians in Greece, Mr. Joannides said, adding that when he received the letter, dated May 23, he put it in his briefcase, where it stayed, unopened, until late July.

After the letter was opened, the Soviet section, which had previously not wanted to talk with Mr. Kampiles, decided he should be interviewed, Mr. Joannides said.

The letter said that in late February in Athens, Mr. Kampiles impulsively joined a party he could see through the windows of the Soviet Embassy. When two men approached him, the letter said, "I decided to play a little game — I told them that I worked for a U.S. Government agency as an economic analyst."

After other meetings, the letter explained, one Russian "asked me directly whether I would like to make a great deal of money on top of what I was already earning," and in two later meetings "I had to convince him that I indeed work for the C.I.A." The letter said they discussed what information Mr. Kampiles could provide and how it would be done.

The defense attorney says the Russians paid Mr. Kampiles \$3,000 and he returned to the United States where he discussed how to feed the Russians false information with a friend who still works for the agency.

The Government prosecutor contends, however, that Mr. Kampiles actually delivered a satellite manual to a Russian military attache in Athens. The prosecution has no witnesses to such a meeting, he said, adding, "The Government's case rests solely on the defendant's own admissions to agents of the Central Intelligence Agency and agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation." The fact that 12 more of the 350 manuals are unaccountably missing will not hurt the Government's case against Mr. Kampiles, the prosecutor said.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-4WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
8 NOVEMBER 1978

CIA Shrugged at Kampiles Plea For Covert Job, Spy Trial Told

HAMMOND, Ind. (AP) — A former CIA employee who is charged with selling a spy-satellite manual to the Soviet Union tried to switch to the CIA's covert section, a government witness says.

George Joannides, a 28-year CIA veteran, was the only witness called in the first day of William P. Kampiles' trial. U.S. District Judge Phil McNaghy adjourned the trial at mid-day to permit the 12 jurors and others to vote in yesterday's elections.

Kampiles, 23, of Munster is charged with selling the top-secret manual to a Russian agent in Greece for \$3,100. A federal grand jury indicted Kampiles in August on six counts of espionage and stealing government property.

The manual Kampiles is accused of selling deals with the KH-11, a photo reconnaissance satellite.

Kampiles, a 1975 Indiana University graduate, worked from March to November 1977 as a CIA watch officer, receiving and relaying cable messages at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va.

Joannides testified that Kampiles contacted him

in the spring of 1977 to enlist his help in transferring to the covert section of the agency.

Joannides said Kampiles expressed an interest in working in Greece because he could speak the language and had relatives there.

Kampiles was told he would need additional training and it would be mid-1978 before he could even be considered for such a post, Joannides said. Kampiles told Joannides he didn't want to stay with the CIA for that long in his post as watch officer, Joannides testified.

Joannides said Kampiles told him during a meeting in Washington in April 1978 that he had met two Russian men at a party in Athens in February and had decided to "play a game with the Russians."

Joannides testified that Kampiles said he was trying to establish himself as a good candidate for an undercover CIA employee by setting up contacts with the Soviets and supplying them with what he called "disinformation."

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THE WASHINGTON POST
8 November 1978

Article appeared
on page A-15

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

U.S. Policy on Iran: Back to Fundamentals

Deepening doubts in the shah's government about true U.S. intentions toward Iran reached a crisis point last Friday, forcing President Carter to send a confidential message to beleaguered Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

Carter's message, telephoned to the shah himself by presidential adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, for the first time spelled out U.S. policy: Do whatever you feel you must to restore authority and stability, Brzezinski said; whatever that is, we are 100 percent behind you.

That message, long overdue, swept aside previous protestations about human rights, liberalization and civil liberties that have been pouring from the State Department for months as the shah battled to keep his country from deserting the West. Indeed, the president's message to the shah is a belated signal of a return by the United States to foreign-policy fundamentals swept away in post-Vietnam guilt.

Descent close to anarchy in the country that keeps Japan, Western Europe and Israel supplied with oil might yet prove to have a beneficial side. A crisis that one knowledgeable official here describes as "an event of the greatest magnitude" has startled presidential aides. They are now entertaining bitter second thoughts about the demise of the Central Intelligence Agency, the overuse of human rights to determine U.S. policy and obsessive fear of using American power.

Just a few weeks ago, a routine request by the shah's government for less than \$100,000 of riot-control gear, including tear gas, was automatically rejected by the burgeoning human-rights bureaucracy at the State Department. An appeal was taken by the Iranian embassy all the way up to Deputy Secretary of State Lucy Benson before the equipment was approved for sale. That is merely icing on the cake of the administration's human-rights policies, which have endangered U.S. relations with its allies all over the world.

More important is gradual extinction of the CIA's ability to engage in covert activity. Officials here make no claims that even at its operational peak 20 years ago, the CIA could have played a decisive role in today's Iran. But the currently weakened agency guarantees that the United States can do nothing to blunt immense Soviet undercover resources now operating without restraint throughout Iran.

The Soviet hand is evident in the carefully coordinated escalation of political demands not only by Moslem fundamentalists and left-wing radicals but also by the shah's presumed allies, the new middle class. This requires agents and money, both available in immense quantities.

A sure signal of the anxiety now gripping the White House was a private appeal for assistance last week to ex-CIA Director Richard Helms, a former ambassador to Iran treated as an untouchable by the Carter administration until now. Helms refused to admit to us that he had even been invited to the White House or to reveal what he said, but the summons points to a change of mood in the Carter White House.

That change of mood is also reflected by the private reaction among high administration officials to a seemingly routine decision by Pakistan to transfer its top diplomat from Washington to Moscow. The switch of ambassador Yakub Khan is a direct result of Pakistan's fear that the Soviet Union is now superseding the United States in political influence over countries that, like Iran, flank the southern border of the Soviet Union.

This directly results from the Russian-engineered coups in Afghanistan and South Yemen, without any U.S. reply. Simultaneously, the Cubans have been used as advance Soviet agents throughout Africa, again with no U.S. response.

Compared with Iran, these Soviet successes are small potatoes. But they have established a psychology of success for Moscow with damaging implications to the United States, setting the stage for the climactic events in Iran.

Ironically, it has taken Iran—the first real foreign crisis for Carter—to force hard thinking about the cost of politically appealing slogans on which the president has based so much of his foreign policy. In particular, the application of human-rights standards to U.S. allies and the continued defamation of the CIA are subject to new and realistic scrutiny.

Jimmy Carter has proved to be a good learner in other aspects of his presidency. There is solid reason to believe that the lesson of Iran is now being learned, and not a moment too soon.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 18

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
13 November 1978

Washington Whispers

When the top authorities on the Middle East—from the State Department, Pentagon, Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Council—were summoned to an emergency meeting on the worsening position of the Shah of Iran, they came to this conclusion: Despite the enormous stakes for the U.S. and its great military strength, Washington is virtually powerless to influence events in Iran.

ARTICLE APPEARED
PAGE A-1NEW YORK TIMES
8 NOVEMBER 1978

Iran Arrests Head of Secret Police Other Officials and Businessmen

By JONATHAN KANDELL

Special to The New York Times

TEHERAN, Iran, Nov. 7 — The military Government formed by Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi announced tonight the arrest of 14 prominent officials and business leaders. The arrests appeared to be an important gesture toward the Shah's political opponents, who have in recent months shaken the country's political structure and its oil-based economy.

Among those arrested was Gen. Nematollah Nassiri, former head of Savak, the internal security agency, which has been accused of using torture under his control. Six former Cabinet ministers were among those detained, and a number of businessmen were charged with corruption.

Government sources said that warrants had been issued for 52 persons but that most of them had not yet been arrested.

Shah Vowed to Fight Corruption

The announcement came in the wake of a speech yesterday by the Shah in which he pledged to deal harshly with corrupt officials or those who had committed severe abuses of power. The monarch said that it was hoped that the military Government he appointed yesterday would turn over power to civilians when political and economic order was restored.

For the last 10 months, the Shah has endured violent demonstrations by stu-

dents, Islamic religious figures, merchants and workers, who have charged his regime with corruption and violation of Islamic laws and have demanded that all political prisoners be released.

The main opposition, led by an exiled Moslem leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, has called for the Shah's overthrow.

As a concession to the opposition, Government sources said that former Information Minister Darioush Homayoun was among the prominent officials arrested. Mr. Homayoun has been accused of responsibility for a letter, extremely critical of Ayatollah Khomeini, that appeared in a newspaper early this year and sparked the uprisings against the Shah.

Little New Violence Reported

Few incidents of violence were reported today. But economic activity in Iran remained greatly reduced as the military Government struggled to end the strikes that crippled the production and distribution of oil.

Long lines of automobiles and people with plastic containers formed at gasoline stations in the capital of the second-largest oil exporting country in the world. With almost no bus transportation and relatively few cars on the streets, businesses closed and some food shortages developed. Uncollected garbage piles are rising throughout the city.

The only incidents in Teheran today were scattered warning shots fired by troops in the bazaar district — a center of dissent against the Shah. Students were kept away from Teheran University, the other focus of confrontations in the capital.

The military Government continued its suspension of newspapers and control over radio and television broadcasts. So reports of the political situation in the provinces were not immediately available.

The new Prime Minister, Gen. Gholam Riza Azhari, echoed last night the Shah's pledge that the military Government would return power to civilians as soon as the political and economic situation returned to normal.

But the fate of the Shah and his military-dominated Cabinet still appeared to depend on a solution to the week-old strike by about 30,000 oil workers in the south. A military governor has been appointed in Khuzestan Province, the center of oil production.

Strikers are demanding wage increases and political concessions, including the lifting of martial law. The country has lost \$60 million a day in exports as production has declined to less than a third of the normal six million barrels.

Some Oil Production Continuing

The striking oil workers have said they are producing and refining enough oil to meet domestic demand. But additional work stoppages by loading and delivery personnel have greatly reduced fuel supplies.

Along Karaj Road, a dusty industrial area on the dun-brown flatland southwest of the city, automobile, tire and metal plants reported that many laborers were absent, apparently because of transit problems caused by the fuel shortage.

In Park-e-Shar, a middle-class district near the bazaar, housewives lined up to buy food at markets as troops guarded the entrances.

"You can still find fruit, but there is no meat being sold here," said Behnam Beruz, an office employee in the working-class neighborhood south of the bazaar. He had not gone to work because the buses were not running.

Along the tree-lined Boulevard Elizabeth II, a wealthy neighborhood, a man sold lamb wrapped in a bloody sheepskin. "I killed it myself this morning," he told a group of house maids who were undecided on whether to buy the meat.

Heavy military reinforcements were brought into Teheran today. A convoy of more than 20 tanks could be seen entering the capital's main western access. Troops stationed themselves at key intersections, squares and every conceivable gathering place that could be used by anti-Shah dissidents. The soldiers also brought a semblance of order to the long queues at gasoline stands, most of which continued to ration out fuel at four gallons a person.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 17THE GUARDIAN
8 November 1978

U.S.: bulwark of Iranian reaction

By JEFF KREMEN

The recent wave of strikes, protests and popular revolts in Iran have made public what the Iranian masses already knew—the shah's reactionary régime maintains its grip on power only through outright repression and support by the U.S. and its imperialist allies.

But the ties between the U.S. and Iran aren't new. They represent an old friendship, a continued pattern of economic and military aid, CIA involvement and, when necessary, military intervention. This partnership, in fact, has often provided U.S. strategists with a prime model for successful imperialist counterinsurgency over four decades.

U.S. STRUGGLE WITH BRITAIN

U.S. involvement in the politics of Iran dates from World War 2. Under the cover of anti-Nazi wartime strategy, the U.S. was also maneuvering to oust the British from their leading economic position in the Middle East. The major attraction, of course, was the Iranian oil reserves.

During the 1930s Britain had created an exclusive trading bloc, erecting barriers against U.S. commodities and threatening to tie up critical raw materials such as oil, essential to the development of U.S. monopoly capitalism.

By World War 2, Britain and the U.S. were struggling for control of the postwar world economy. Throughout the war, the U.S. used its foreign aid and international loans as a lever to manipulate the level of British currency reserves and liabilities, and to open up Britain's former trading bloc to U.S. imperialist penetration.

Reza Shah, father of the present ruler of Iran, refused to take a stand against the Germans and Italians. The British and the Soviet Union mounted a joint attack, and in August 1941, occupied Iran. Reza Shah was deposed and Crown Prince Reza Pahlevi, the current shah, remained on the throne with limited powers. In the end of 1942, the first detachments of a 30,000-man U.S. troop force arrived to protect massive foreign aid shipments passing through Iran to U.S. allies.

Under the terms of the Tri-Partite Treaty of Alliance signed by Britain, the USSR and Iran in January 1942, the U.S. presence in Iran was described as a mere adjunct to the British presence. The terms of the treaty restricted the Iranian forces to "the maintenance of internal security on Iranian territory."

In August 1942, General Norman Schwarzkopf, former chief of the New Jersey State Police, arrived in Tehran to take charge of the reorganization of the Imperial Iranian

Gendamerie. As Schwarzkopf later wrote, "security in Iran bears importance directly comparable to American interests in Iran."

Meanwhile the presence of an occupying army contributed to mushrooming inflation in Iran. The cost of living increased sevenfold from 1941-45. Rioting over bread shortages erupted regularly in major cities. The diversion of rail and motor transport by the occupiers produced shortages and forced up prices.

By 1946 the U.S. ambassador to Iran was seriously worried about leftist uprisings in the country. The most serious of these was the 1945 Azerbaijan rebellion. The insurrection was led by the communist Tudeh (masses) Party, and was openly supported by the Soviet troops in Iran. The rebellion's major demand was regional autonomy. In neighboring Western Azerbaijan, the Kurdish People's Republic, also backed by the Soviets, had already declared its autonomy.

Threatened by a treaty and a military alliance between the rebel governments, the U.S. decided to strengthen Iran's central government and to form a solid front against the Soviet Union. At the urging of the U.S., Iran brought the autonomy matter before the UN Security Council in January 1946. A solution was negotiated in which the USSR withdrew Soviet troops in return for oil concessions. The concessions never materialized, but without Soviet support the insurgencies were easily crushed. The Tudeh Party was scattered, and the army and the landowners returned to power.

1953 COUP BRINGS U.S. CONTROL

The U.S. began initial moves to improve its own access to Iranian oil in the fall of 1947. Denied direct concessions, Standard of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum concluded an agreement with the Anglo-Iranian oil company, effectively controlled by British Petroleum. The agreement assured the two U.S. corporations a large proportion of the Anglo-Iranian crude oil output for the next 20 years.

The control of oil also became a decisive factor in Iranian politics in the years leading up to the CIA-backed coup in 1953. That coup firmly consolidated the dictatorship of the shah.

Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, a popular and progressive nationalist figure, had pressed for nationalization of the oil industry, while simultaneously opposing the reassertion of royal and military power. The threat of nationalization eventually led U.S. policy makers to intervene.

The CIA-inspired coup began to unfold in early August, with the return of Gen. Schwarzkopf to Tehran. On Aug. 13 the shah signed a decree dismissing Mossadegh and replacing him with the royalist Gen. Zahedi. The result was days of unrest and fighting. The shah fled to Baghdad on Aug. 16 and then went to Rome to confer with CIA chief Allen Dulles. After the shah's departure, the Tudeh Party led demonstrations in Tehran. Crowds destroyed statues of the shah and celebrated his apparent overthrow.

But from secret headquarters Zahedi ordered army units into the city to attack the demonstrators. At least 300 were killed in the fighting. At the same time CIA agents went into action, handing out thousands of dollars to lumpen elements and fascist mobs. A tide of counterrevolution, carefully orchestrated, allowed Zahedi and royalist forces to announce a victory on Aug. 19. The shah returned in triumph on Aug. 22, demanding immediate U.S. aid. Mossadegh was imprisoned and leaders of the Tudeh executed.

Once the uprising was put down, the U.S. announced that it would give \$23 million in aid for 1953, and a \$45 million emergency grant. During the next three years \$250 million in aid was poured into the new regime. In the first year \$1.7 million of these funds went for bonuses to the army, gendamerie and police. In 1957 Schwarzkopf helped set up the Sazman-i-Amniyat va Kishvar, or SAVAK, Iran's notorious secret police.

At the same time a new formula for U.S. control of Iranian oil was worked out by the State Department. Under a facade of nationalization, a consortium of Western companies gained exclusive management and full rights to the output of Iranian oil until 1994. Five U.S. giants received 40% of the output, Royal Dutch Shell was given 14%, and the Compagnie Francaise des Petroles took 6%. Anglo-Iranian kept a 40% share and ultimately received \$510 million compensation.

Direct military rule in Iran ended in 1957. With the general decrease in political tension, and the weakened forces of what remained of the opposition, the security services were supplemented by SAVAK.

At the time of its creation, SAVAK was a relatively small organization with limited capabilities. Over its 21-year history it has developed into an institution of terror, equipped with the most advanced torture instruments. SAVAK personnel have been trained by representatives of the CIA and the MOSSAD, the Israeli intelligence service.

CONTINUED

1963 UPRISINGS

By 1960, attempting to qualify for a \$35 million emergency credit line from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Iranian government tried to institute an economic stabilization program. Its failure led to a recession, marked by bankruptcy and unemployment. IMF credit was withdrawn.

Throughout the spring of 1963 opposition to the government mounted among religious leaders in major cities. In March, theological students at Qum held demonstrations which provoked SAVAK to occupy the town's mosques, shrines and theology schools. Ayatollah Khomeini, an influential religious leader in Qum, was arrested in June. Within hours huge crowds had gathered in the bazaars of Tehran. Troops opened fire that night and thousands were killed and injured.

Two years later there was a dramatic improvement in the Iranian economy as U.S. oil interests became more directly involved. In 1965 U.S. Allied Chemical Corporation signed an agreement for the construction of a \$100 million petrochemical production unit at Bandur Shapur. In the same year work began on a \$20 million U.S.-backed project in Bandar Abbas, another Persian Gulf port.

At the same time, the Iranian ruling classes turned toward international banking and investment institutions like Lazard Freres, Chase International, the International Basic Economic Corporation, and the First Boston Corporation.

The problem remained of how to protect growing U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf from nationalization or leftist seizure. Originally, British troops provided the principal guarantee of these interests. But by the end of the 1960s it was clear that Britain, a waning imperialist power, would not be able to maintain its Gulf forces much longer.

In the wake of its defeats in Indochina, the U.S. turned to the "Nixon doctrine," a strategy in which local reactionary regimes were supported if they would defend U.S. economic interests.

The Iranian government was selected for the task of "protecting" Western interests in the Gulf, and its armed forces expanded rapidly with U.S. and British help.

Today the Iranian army is the largest and best-equipped in the Middle East, and Iran is presently the world's largest importer of arms. By the early 1980s experts predict that Iran will have a tank force as large as those of Britain, France and Italy combined. Its helicopter force will be second only to those of the U.S. and the USSR, and it will have 800 of the most modern combat aircraft.

Large numbers of U.S. military advisers, many of them Vietnam veterans, are in Iran, and the number is expected to increase to 60,000 by 1980.

Since 1941, when it first took a hand in Iran's internal affairs, to the present, U.S. imperialism has been the material prop to a fascist regime. The fact that the shah today has more economic resources and more firepower to maintain himself represents the logical conclusion of the long U.S. role in Iran.

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6 November 1978

C.I.A. Head Accused of Tailoring Estimates to Policy; He Denies It

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov 5. — Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence, is being accused in the intelligence community of distorting estimates to make them dovetail with the Carter Administration's foreign policy. He denies the allegations.

The estimates cover long-range prognoses on such issues as Soviet military capabilities, the balance of forces on the Korean Peninsula, Soviet strategic intentions in the Indian Ocean and the outlook for energy production worldwide, particularly in the Soviet Union. Often they form a basis for far-reaching policy decisions by the President on foreign relations and defense priorities.

As described by one of the director's critics, an official in the intelligence community, "Turner has been highly dissatisfied with a large number of national intelligence estimates, and he has been more demanding and more pre-emptive than any Director of Central Intelligence in recent times."

Heavy Involvement Acknowledged

In an interview Admiral Turner acknowledged that he had heavily involved himself in the production of the so-called national intelligence estimates — considered the most important product of the American intelligence community — as well as in lesser estimate and analysis functions. However, he maintained that he had neither distorted estimates nor manipulated them to serve White House policy goals.

"If I am ever suspected of slanting estimates in favor of policy I will be much less useful," he said. "If I wanted to influence policy I would have to be so subtle. If detected it would reverse the effect."

The allegations have come to light in various branches of the intelligence community — military and civilian — and in the Central Intelligence Agency itself, where the 55-year-old director remains a controversial figure 19 months after taking charge.

None of his critics deny his technical right to take charge of the production of intelligence estimates, which is authorized under executive orders. As in the past, the national estimates are issued under the director's name; what has changed, it appears, is Admiral Turner's involvement in what he describes as restructuring and redrafting.

'Convince, Cajole or Bully'

In a number of instances, according to the critic of Admiral Turner in the intelligence community, he has "asked the community to redo the estimates or has rewritten them and sent them on without further reference to the National Foreign Intelligence Board, or he has sent them back to convince, cajole or bully the other participants into alternative estimates." As a result, this official and others said, there have been noticeable delays in the production of estimates.

In the interview, at C.I.A. headquarters in McLean, Va., Admiral Turner commented on these allegations: "I have no hesitation to delay an estimate a week or two, or a month or two. I have not slowed up any where there was an urgency to get it to the consumer."

As to the question of rewriting estimates put together by teams in various parts of the intelligence community, he commented: "I am not bashful about that. I end up telling them this section has to be redrafted. You won't find many sentences I personally penned. Mostly it is because they didn't bring out two views strongly. Another way, I look at the outline, the concept at the beginning, and I restructure that, saying, You are asking the question wrong."

One redrafting that caused controversy in the community last year concerned an estimate of the balance of strength between North Korea and South Korea pinned to the question of what withdrawal of 40,000 United States troops stationed in

the South would mean. Admiral Turner concluded, contrary to the original estimate, that withdrawal would substantially diminish the deterrent balance on the peninsula. He won praise from some C.I.A. analysts on that one and criticism from other quarters.

There was another controversy last year over the national estimate on Soviet intentions in the Indian Ocean, which was also held up for redrafting by Admiral Turner and ended up with what some termed a predictable bias toward gloom. "People thought they were dealing with the Lord High Admiral," a Defense Department analyst remarked.

Lately the concern of the critics has focused on the question whether Admiral Turner has used his function as the court of last resort on estimates to support Administration policy. This criticism arose over data on the Soviet economy, particularly its energy sector, where he was alleged to favor "worst case" analysis to suggest that the United States could effectively apply pressure on the Soviet Union through denial of exports of advanced technology.

Carter Ordered Top-Level Review

Last summer President Carter drew on some of these estimates in making his decision to order top-level review of all such export deals with the Soviet Union and to delay authorization of a sale of oil-drill bits for a time, intelligence officials said.

One of those critical of Admiral Turner put the situation this way: "The great trap of intelligence is to search for evidence supporting your own view. That is forbidden territory, and if you have access to policy makers you can become sensitized into justifying their decisions." This critic said that Admiral Turner's estimations of Soviet energy development "was a classic of transgression."

The director, replying to the allegations, said: "I have no policy-making function. It is mandatory that I present good estimates." He acknowledged, however, that he had dispensed with the long-time practice of registering dissenting views as footnotes, incorporating them in his final text instead.

Black Crayon on Beige Blackboard

A man given to diagramming since his active duty in the Navy, which included a tour at NATO, he moved from his chair to a beige blackboard in his seventh-floor office and wrote out with a black crayon: "One man estimating," "Estimating by committee" and "N.F.I.B.," the abbreviation for the National Foreign Intelligence Board. He explained that his system was to have an estimate prepared by the community and submitted to the board, which he chairs. "At that point the one-man system comes in, because I decide, I sign for it, I vouch for it," he said. "I am the chief intelligence officer for the country."

Another policy area where critics find fault with Admiral Turner concerns his penchant for publishing and widely distributing sanitized versions of intelligence estimates and analyses. An analysis issued last summer by his recently established National Foreign Assessment Center entitled "The Scope of Poland's Economic Dilemma" enraged State Department officials because it cut across the Administration's policy of supporting Polish efforts to cope with balance-of-payment and trade deficits.

"No comment," Admiral Turner replied to a query on the matter, but he then said: "When things deserve to be published they'll be published. I am pleased there is so much concern. Everybody puts out right and left here. In short, they are excited because we made them work harder. I don't think putting out facts can be inimical to United States policy."

He sat back and grinned: "It's an antithesis. On the one hand I am prostituted to policy and on the other I am undermining policy."

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
6 November 1978

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on page A-5

Turner Accused of Slanting Reports to Fit Carter Policy

New York Times News Service

CIA Director Stansfield Turner is being accused in the intelligence community of distorting estimates to make them dovetail with the Carter administration's foreign policy. He denies the allegations, saying that he has no policymaking role but that "it is mandatory that I present good estimates."

The estimates cover long-range prognoses on such issues as Soviet military capabilities, the balance of forces on the Korean Peninsula, Soviet strategic intentions in the Indian Ocean and the outlook for energy production worldwide, particularly in the Soviet Union. Often they form a basis for far-reaching policy decisions by the president on foreign relations and defense priorities.

One of Turner's critics, an official in the intelligence community, said,

"Turner has been highly dissatisfied with a large number of national intelligence estimates, and he has been more demanding and more preemptive than any director of central intelligence in recent times."

Some critics say that redrafted estimates of Soviet intentions ordered by Turner end up with a predictable bias toward gloom.

In an interview, Turner acknowledged that he had heavily involved himself in the production of the so-called national intelligence estimates — considered the most important product of the American intelligence community — as well as in lesser estimate and analysis functions.

However, he maintained that he had neither distorted estimates nor manipulated them to serve White House policy goals.

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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
8 November 1978

Soviets out to free two spies

Washington

The Soviet Union has launched a campaign to secure the release of two of its citizens who were convicted of spying in the United States. And US officials fear that it could affect the treatment of two American citizens now being detained in the Soviet Union.

Publicly, the State Department is treating the cases of a US businessman, Leo Sonner, and an unidentified Illinois woman strictly as "consular matters," which are not linked to the case of two Soviet UN employees who were recently convicted of spying, Monitor correspondent Dan Southerland reports.

But officials note that the Soviet Union has recently intensified its protests over the arrest and conviction of the two men, and they believe that the KGB, the Soviet secret police, is pushing strongly within the Soviet bureaucracy to secure their release.

Initial wire service reports of a traffic incident involving Mr. Sonner indicate that it may have been staged by the Soviets. Little is known, publicly at least, about a possible customs violation committed at Moscow's Sheremetyevo International Airport by the American woman, who also is under detention.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A16THE WASHINGTON POST
6 November 1978

Soviet TV Hits Spy Trial, Warns U.S. of Backlash

By Kevin Klose

Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW — A Soviet commentator last night demanded the immediate repatriation of two convicted Soviet spies from the United States, denouncing their 50-year prison sentences as "monstrous" and warning that the case could have a chilling effect on Soviet-American relations.

It was the first public comment here since the sentences against Valdik Enger, 39, and Rudolph Chernyayev, 43, were handed down Monday by U.S. District Court Judge Frederick Lacey in New Jersey. The Soviets, U.N. employees, were convicted last month of naval espionage.

Kremlin officials had predicted in advance that if the two were sentenced to prison instead of being allowed to return to the Soviet Union, the newly improved Moscow-Washington relations could be set back sharply.

Soviet television commentator Dmitri Morozov declared on the national news show Vremya (Time): "Any man of common sense cannot but draw the conclusion that the court persecutions of Enger and Chernyayev must be immediately stopped and they should be allowed to return to the motherland without any obstacles."

He denounced the New Jersey proceedings as "an absurdity," and warned that "the U.S. authorities must remember that while arranging such provocations, they take on themselves the full re-

sponsibility for their consequences."

Morozov added: "It is not accidental that the trial of our Soviet diplomats was timed to coincide with the opening of the [U.N.] General Assembly and announcement of their sentence coincided when some shift has occurred of such an importance for the cause of peace as concluding an agreement on the new strategic arms limitation treaty." He said the trial was the work of "those opposed to improvements in Soviet-American relations."

The commentator appeared with Soviet diplomat Vladimir Zinyakin beside him. Zinyakin was arrested last May with Enger and Chernyayev but released because he had diplomatic immunity which the other two, as staff, are not accorded in the United States.

Zinyakin, who has been quoted in the official Tass news agency in recent weeks denouncing the trial, reiterated his remarks for the national audience, asserting that FBI "gangsters" yanked the three from a car, shouted obscenities, handcuffed the man and terrorized them with a "colt revolver."

The Soviets have rejected the American belief that the arrest trial and conviction this fall of American businessman Francis J. Crawford was a frame-up arranged in retaliation for the arrests of Enger and Chernyayov. The Soviets contend that they treated Crawford well by allowing him to leave the Soviet Union without serving a prison sentence as a sign of their desire for improved relations.

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NEWSWEEK

13 NOVEMBER 1978

Periscope

HUSHING THE CIA

With SALT II talks winding down to a crucial stage, the U.S. has become so sensitive about its relations with the Soviet Union that the National Security Council saw fit to squelch a rare attempt at candor on the part of the CIA. It all began when the CBS "60 Minutes" program asked for CIA films on the mission of the Glomar Explorer, the ship that tried to retrieve a sunken Soviet submarine on a CIA assignment in the Pacific Ocean in 1974. The CIA itself favored releasing the footage to show off the technological accomplishments of the once secret project, but the NSC has rejected the CBS request for fear of offending the Russians. Meantime, the CIA is studying "A Matter of Risk," a new book on the Glomar Explorer episode, to see whether co-author Wayne Collier might have violated any secrecy agreements. Collier worked on the mission as a recruiter retained by the CIA to hire the ship's crew.

MORE CUBANS IN AFRICA

U.S. intelligence has learned that Cuba will send 700 civilian technicians to Mozambique, which will then have nearly 1,000 such advisers—the largest civilian contingent that Cuba has sent to any one country. There already are about 500 Cuban military advisers in Mozambique helping train black Rhodesian guerrillas.

—BILL ROEDER with bureau reports

TRYING TO FREE SHCHARANSKY

U.S. efforts to free imprisoned Soviet dissident Anatoly Shcharansky (page 93) are continuing on several fronts. In one recent approach, State Department human-rights chief Patricia Derian sounded out Wolfgang Vogel, an East German lawyer known for negotiating U.S.-Soviet spy swaps. He was noncommittal, but New York Congressman Benjamin Gilman, who worked with Vogel in arranging a spy exchange in the past, plans to meet with him this month. Some observers consider a conventional exchange of prisoners unlikely in the Shcharansky case, but think the Russians might release him in return for a U.S. "expulsion" of Rudolf Chernyayev and Valdik Enger, the former Soviet U.N. employees who were each sentenced in New Jersey last week to 50 years in prison for espionage. Both are appealing the sentences.

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ON PAGE 24

PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
23 October 1978

DATELINE WASHINGTON

By Susan Wagner

Judge Curbs Snepp Writing

Former CIA agent Frank W. Snepp III ran into a stone wall recently when he asked for a stay of the order restricting what he can write about the intelligence agency.

Snepp was placed under court order last July after publication of his book "Decent Interval" (Random House) about the fall of Saigon. U.S. District Court Judge Oren R. Lewis said the former CIA employee had broken his contract with the agency by failing to submit his manuscript for review prior to publication.

This decision has been appealed, but while a decision in the appeal was pending, Snepp unsuccessfully sought Judge Lewis's permission to submit two stories that grew out of his experiences in Vietnam for publication to national magazines. One is a short story about a CIA agent who falls in love with a Frenchwoman. The other tells about the disillusionment of some State Department officials with the government.

"I'm not questioning this man's loyalty to the United States," Judge Lewis said in his rejection of the request. "If he's got a right to print these two articles, he's got a right to print book number two, book number three and anything he wants to."

Snepp argues that writing is his new career and that he plans books or articles about refugee work and his trial, and also spy novels for which he has a contract with Random House. All of them must be cleared with the CIA under the order placed on him by Judge Lewis even if they do not contain classified material. □

Article appeared
on page B-4

THE WASHINGTON POST
8 November 1978

CIA Discount Store Investigated by FBI

By Jane Seaberry
Washington Post Staff Writer

The FBI said yesterday it is investigating allegations of "irregularities" in the management of an employee-run discount store at the Central Intelligence Agency's Langley headquarters.

An FBI spokesman said the investigation was started at the request of the CIA and is being handled by the FBI's "white-collar crime squad," the FBI spokesman said and no formal charges have been filed in the case.

A man who answered the telephone at the store yesterday said that the store did not have a manager and refused further comment. "I'm just trying to run things until they get a new manager," another employee said.

A CIA spokesman would not comment on the case. "We do not comment on matters under investigation," she said.

The CIA spokesman said the store is for the convenience of agency employees and sells watches, radios, televisions, tools and houseware items at discount prices much like a military exchange.

The FBI spokesman said he would not comment further on the case until charges, if any, are filed.

Article appeared
on page 13

AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY
6 November 1978



All Russian and U.S. proposals made in current SALT 2 strategic arms limitation talks have been submitted to the U.S. intelligence community for appraisal as to its ability to verify the constraints, according to Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of central intelligence. U.S. negotiators receive "suggestions" for changes that "would help us to better verify," Adm. Turner said in his first public appearance at the National Press Club in Washington.

NAVY TIMES
13 NOVEMBER 1978

COMMENTARY

CIA Is Out in the Cold in Role As Carter Public Affairs Arm

By ELMOR R. ZUMWALT
And WORTH H. BAGLEY

THE CIA is fast becoming a purveyor of constructed news on the Soviet Union for President Carter. This CIA reporting ignores events in the United States and invariably supports Carter foreign policies.

Thus, according to the CIA, there are glad tidings that imply we are gaining an advantage in United States-Soviet competition.

Soviet debt to world bankers is so high that interest payments are slowing economic growth, according to the agency.

But the CIA skimps on details. We are not told what Soviet capital investment is being made with the immense amounts of borrowed funds nor the extent to which industrial modernization is being achieved.

And the agency does not provide a sensible frame of reference to measure Soviet progress. It does not tell us that Western experts foresee U.S. annual economic growth falling to less than two percent next year. That fall in productivity will occur because Americans do not have dollars for investment and expansion.

Having told us that Soviet economy is stagnant because it is mired in debt service payments, the CIA goes on to say that this "stagnating" industrial apparatus will seriously diminish domestic oil reserves in the coming decade.

The CIA seems to want it both ways. The Soviet economy is stalled, but if it isn't it will be.

(In any event, non-CIA observers don't anticipate any serious decline in Soviet oil surplus in the 1980s.)

The CIA desire to serve the President also is extending into the defense field. A recent CIA report informed the American people that the Soviets have not tested their new land-based strategic nuclear missiles.

This is good news for those who believe a SALT II agreement will constrain Soviet arms. The United States wants to include in such an agreement a provision limiting deployment of new nuclear weapons not already tested when the accord is signed. Opponents of SALT II base their arguments on evidence the Soviets are hell-bent on expanding their missile arsenal. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown had previously reported Soviet development of huge, new, land-based missiles, a Soviet advance that is again at odds with the spirit — if not the substance — of the 1972 SALT I agreement.

But according to the CIA, the Soviets have delayed tests. This creates the impression that the President's moral suasion must now be working on the hard-line Kremlin.

But again the CIA restrained itself from telling Americans what the Soviets are doing. In the past few months Moscow has tested a new submarine-launched strategic nuclear ballistic missile. For the first time, that type missile is fitted with multiple re-entry vehicles. In fact, each missile has the capability to deploy seven MIRVs. But, just as important, other observed Soviet strategic nuclear missile tests show a great improvement in accuracy — within 200 yards at 6000 miles. In combination with megatonnage and throw weight advantages, these two developments give the Soviet Union the capability for a nuclear first strike against the United States in the mid 1980s.

While the CIA was avoiding telling the American public this bad news, Mr. Carter's arms control agency produced a study claiming an indefinite U.S. lead in strategic nuclear destructive capability. Alarmed by the slanted analysis in that report, informed observers of SALT outside the government have refuted its conclusions fact by fact.

The President himself has sought to offset the loss of the administration's credibility in this case by publicly revealing the CIA's photo satellite capability.

Mr. Carter says the CIA can thereby verify what the Soviet Union is doing with its nuclear strategic forces and thus protect the United States in SALT agreement.

But our photographs cannot invade Soviet research laboratories or the minds of Soviet decision-makers so its news will be late. Former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird has written of Soviet cheating in SALT I, a fact that became evident to the United States only after it had been achieved, as was the discovery of their oversized missiles. The President seems to have forgotten that this is a world that has already seen Soviet nuclear blackmail resisted by us with our then nuclear superiority in the Cuban crisis of 1962 and acceded to by us in the October 1973 Mideast crisis after our superiority had waned.

The CIA also has some public comments on Soviet non-nuclear or conventional forces. A recent CIA report informs us that Soviet manpower will be inadequate in the 1980s to operate their larger complement of modern combat arms.

But, perhaps unknown to the CIA, the United States and the West have the same problem. We are grappling with the issue now and it may be worse than in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet problem, according to the CIA, is a scarcity of qualified technical manpower. However, while the Kremlin can simply conscript the needed technical trainees, the United States, under the voluntary system may very well be unable to recruit the men and women in sufficient numbers.

The CIA's new role as the President's public relations arm is risky. It won't be long before the CIA is unable to distinguish between fact and prejudice. From what we can see now is the time to understand the difference.

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NEW YORK TIMES
15 NOVEMBER 1978

U.S., Short on Intelligence and Tied to the Shah, Decided It Had to Support Him

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 14—Early this month, as the political turmoil in Iran appeared to be getting out of control, a high-level group of Carter Administration aides met to determine what, if anything, the United States could do to help stabilize the situation.

Several alternatives for American action were considered at the meeting at the White House, which occurred on Nov. 2, including State Department suggestions that Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi be asked to bring his opponents into a coalition government or even that pressure be put upon him to abdicate. In the end, however, it was decided that the United States had no real alternative but to offer unconditional support for the Shah.

The next day, Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's adviser on national security, telephoned the Shah, telling him that the White House would give full backing to any effort he took to restore order. Two days later, with the apparent support of the United States, the Shah formed a military Government which, for the time being at least, has served to halt spiral of riots and strikes.

Frustration Amid Little Information

The episode reflects the frustration expressed by many officials involved in the Iranian crisis. Several factors, including the inadequacy of intelligence information, are said to have narrowed American choices, forcing the White House to adopt a policy described by one Presidential aide as "voicing support for the Shah, but doing little more than watching, waiting and hoping."

The United States, despite its long history of involvement in Iranian politics and fully aware of Iran's strategic importance to the West, has nonetheless found itself unable to influence events there.

Strangely, in view of the United States' limited choices, giving the Shah a free hand appears to have paid off. But few believe that military rule offers a long-term solution to the Shah's problems.

Several State Department officials believe that with more warning, the Administration could have assumed a more active role early in the crisis, pressing the Shah to enter discussions with his opponents. But the disorder is widely acknowledged to have caught the Administration off guard. "In hindsight," one specialist remarked, "we should have seen it coming and been prepared. But the threat of an internal revolt was seen as the least likely contingency."

Politics of Oil and Reform

The Administration's policy now is to continue to offer full support for the Shah's efforts to quell the riots and strikes that have led to a cutback in oil production and thus endangered the economy. American officials also expressed hope that once the situation was under control, the Shah would be able to reinstate the program of gradual liberalization that he embarked on two years ago.

At the same time, the crisis is said to have spurred a review of some basic aspects of Administration foreign policy, ranging from its support for human rights, to its use of arms sales, to its priorities for intelligence collection.

One of the most controversial questions still confronting officials is whether the

White House should have accepted the advice of State Department regional specialists who argued for some type of coalition rule for Iran. While some officials argued that such an arrangement was yet possible, a majority believed that the decision to refrain from pushing the Shah in this direction was correct.

Shah Didn't Solicit U.S. Advice

The majority noted that the Shah's own efforts to form a coalition had ended in failure, and they cited other factors that limited the Administration's options.

One of the most important limitations was said to have been that the Shah did not appear receptive to American advice. Despite reports that the monarch often seemed overwhelmed by the disorders, American officials insist that he never sought advice on specific decisions.

The United States Ambassador in Teheran, William H. Sullivan, and others kept in close touch with the Shah, but officials here said that the Americans, not the Shah, had prompted contacts. "The Shah's a big boy," a White House aide said. "He knows his country better than we do and he's not exactly the kind of person who is used to following orders."

Officials also said the Administration's stance on the Iranian crisis was based on

a strong desire not to reinforce an argument used by the Shah's opponents — that Iran is an "American puppet."

"We haven't wanted to appear to be running the show," a State Department official said.

Several officials said that a critical limit on American involvement was the lack of hard intelligence data. They said that when widespread rioting broke out last summer, practically nothing was known about the makeup and aims of the various factions arrayed against the Shah, especially the Moslem fundamentalists who appeared to have the best organization and the largest following.

C.I.A. Estimate of Danger Disputed

"The C.I.A. simply missed the whole thing," said one high-ranking official, adding that when the rioting began, the agency was putting the final touches on an intelligence estimate that said the Shah faced no significant internal threats.

Intelligence officers contend that the failure to predict the revolt and to identify the main elements of the Shah's opposition stemmed from the lack of interest of Administration policymakers in Iranian politics. State Department and White House officials disputed this, and one said that more than a year ago, the C.I.A. was asked to prepare a study on the impact of Moslem traditionalists on the stability of such countries as Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. The agency was said by this aide to have reported that it could not find anyone to do it.

One immediate result of the Iranian crisis is a review of the policy governing arms sales to Iran and to other allies.

Although the acceleration of American arms deliveries to Iran and the Middle East stemmed from the dramatic increase in the price of oil after 1973, it also reflected the view that Iran was a pillar of stability in the area and a bulwark against the expansion of Soviet influence into regions surrounding the Indian Ocean.

Iranian Arms Were Not Cut Back

In the Nixon-Ford years, with the United States cutting back on its global military commitments, the Shah was sold more than \$10 billion in advanced weapons. The Carter Administration, despite its goal of reducing arms sales, has continued this practice, agreeing to deals exceeding \$5 billion during 1977-78.

But these sales are acknowledged to have created a new and serious security risk. "The worst contingency," a Pentagon official said, "is the possibility of an anti-American regime coming to power and having those weapons arrayed against us. But even a neutralist Iran, or one weakened by continuing strife, would pose huge new problems in the Gulf."

CONTINUED

As a result, National Security Council aides have begun to question the strategy of relying heavily on local powers to protect American interests and, according to one, the Administration is accelerating programs for training and equipping special American combat units for combat in the Persian Gulf.

Officials agree, however, that forces for intervening in the area would be of little use in dealing with crises like the one in Iran, which is largely a case of social turmoil growing out of the tensions of rapid modernization.

In the short run, they said, better intelligence would be necessary to enable the Administration to anticipate domestic problems in critical countries.

'Regional Influentials' Get Priority

But in the longer term, they maintained, Iran should not be seen as an isolated case, but perhaps indicative of the problems that countries such as Saudi Arabia, Brazil or Nigeria might soon face. Like Iran, these "regional influentials," as Mr. Brzezinski has termed them, have been accorded high priority in Administration policy, and all have embarked on ambitious development programs and tentative moves toward liberalization.

In part these steps toward liberalization stemmed from the Administration's emphasis on human rights, and some officials acknowledged that the policy may have added to Iranian political strains. At the same time, they argued that the reforms initiated in Iran in recent years were not stimulated only by American pressure, but rather reflected the Shah's

recognition that continued political stability required a gradual move toward democracy.

As a result, officials contend the Administration's human rights policy played a minimal role in the current crisis.

Whether Iran and other key third world nations can make an orderly transition and what role the United States can play in the process have become dominant questions for the Administration.

"The problem of assisting these countries through modernization and liberalization is probably the biggest challenge we face," one high-ranking official said. "because for all our talk, we really don't know how to do it."

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ON PAGE 17

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
20 NOVEMBER 1978

Washington Whispers

U.S. diplomatic officials have become so concerned over the mental state of the Shah of Iran—he is said to be subject to periods of depression and withdrawal—that the White House felt impelled to prod him on several occasions to act forcefully to maintain his tenuous hold on his nation.

★ ★ ★

The White House is reported to be furious over what is considered a "major intelligence breakdown" by the CIA in Iran that failed to give the U.S. a quick and accurate report on who the country's new military leaders are and what they stand for.

★ ★ ★

THE NEW REPUBLIC
18 November 1978

Article appeared
on page 9, 12

Where the finger-pointers
should be pointing.

Who Lost Iran?

Even with the shah still tottering on his peacock throne last week, the "Who lost Iran?" talk was starting in Washington. If and when the monarchy collapses, with all the enormous strategic implications that might have, it seems likely that the finger-pointers' favorite targets will be President Carter's human rights policy and those in the State Department who still take it seriously. But the blame will be misdirected. If the shah falls, it will primarily be the shah's own fault. But it will also be the fault of those American officials who for more than 10 years have kept the US government cut off from opposition groups in Iran, with the result that the Carter administration had no idea that things would get as bad as they are for the shah and now has no idea what to do about it.

An indication of how the culprit-hunting is likely to go was provided in an NBC-TV interview with Henry Kissinger, who said that the administration should stop making statements that encourage the shah's opposition, and instead should give the shah unswerving support. The United States, Kissinger said off-camera, "has to bear some responsibility" for the crisis in Iran.

Along the same line, another former high-ranking official of the last administration said that early Carter criticism of the shah's human rights inadequacies encouraged the opposition to think the United States might withdraw its support from the regime. Even when President Carter made it clear that basic American policy had not changed, this former official said, "it sounded as though the administration was saying 'we still regard the shah as a repressive dictator, but he's too important for us to oppose.' The message to the people in the streets was, 'go at him.'"

According to the finger-pointers, the Carter administration nagged mercilessly for the shah to liberalize, and when he released some political prisoners, reined in the secret police and loosened up on censorship, the result was that the top blew off of his country. The blame for this is being directed variously at US Ambassador William Sullivan, who delivers the State Department's messages in Tehran, and at the department's human rights chief, Patricia Derian, whose office has been pushing for reforms. Sullivan, one of those iron ambassadors who gets sent to hard places like Laos and the Philippines, is likely to survive the heat. The human rights staff may be more vulnerable. Already the word is out that it wanted to deny the shah tear gas to control his riots. The State Department also is accused, in these life-or-death days, of combining its statements of support for the shah with prodding remarks about elections and free

speech—implicitly signaling displeasure with the shah and giving comfort to those who want to oust him.

There is even some evidence that Zbigniew Brzezinski, the president's national security adviser, is playing (or anticipating) "Who lost Iran?". His personal statement of support for the shah contained no namby-pamby references to liberalization and, according to columnists Evans and Novak, he called the shah on President Carter's behalf to tell him: "Do whatever you feel you must to restore authority and stability. Whatever it is, we are 100 percent behind you." If this really happened as reported, and I believe it did, Brzezinski in effect was inviting the shah to save himself by using any methods his sadistic imagination might suggest. Brutality so far has worked for Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, but in his case, it has been roundly (and rightly) condemned by the United States. Evans and Novak also delightedly reported, that the Iranian crisis has presidential aides "entertaining bitter doubts about the demise of the Central Intelligence Agency, the overuse of human rights to determine US policy and obsessive fear of using American power."

Experiencing its first major international scare, it seems that the Carter administration is dropping what might be termed the Christian approach to world affairs, and opting for the Machiavellian alternative: in a real crunch, anything goes. Morality is out at the White House, and *realpolitik* is in.

There are two apparent reasons for this switch. One is political. If the shah falls, the White House does not want President Carter blamed for it; better the finger-pointers should aim at the State Department. The second reason is strategic. Iran really is important, one of the most important places in the world, and its "loss" would be a stunning blow indeed. Iran has been the dependable supplier of 13 percent of America's oil imports and even larger proportions for Japan and much of Europe. It is also Israel's largest supplier. More important, it is the most populous and militarily powerful nation on the Persian Gulf, the single largest source of free world oil. Iran dominates—and the shah's navy protects—the Straits of Hormuz, the narrow waterway through which these oil supplies are transported.

Under the shah, Iran also has served as a pro-Western barrier against Soviet expansion toward the Gulf and the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean to the South. Iran helped the oil state of Oman put down one radical rebellion, and has been viewed as a source of stability to other weak countries in the region. To help Iran perform its role as a bulwark of Western interests, the United States has sold some \$15 billion worth of military supplies to the shah since 1971, including some of our most sophisticated hardware.

CONTINUED

Overthrow of the shah would not necessarily lead to a cutoff of oil or actual Soviet advances in the region, but any American administration obviously must be worried by threats to what has seemed a stable status quo. This administration may be even more worried than others, because it already stands accused of presiding over a steady erosion of American power in the area. Afghanistan has been taken over by Communists and its neighbor, Pakistan, has decided to transfer its ambassador, Yakub Khan, from Washington to Moscow as a demonstration of flagging confidence in the US. South Yemen, too, has fallen to pro-Soviet elements, and that causes nervousness in Saudi Arabia and other West-leaning countries in the region. It is not just Republicans and right-wing Democrats who accuse the Carter administration of not being tough enough in foreign policy; our allies do, as well. If the shah were to fall, inevitably it would be perceived as a loss to the United States and a gain for the Soviet Union. And countries around Asia and the Middle East would join in finger-pointing at the Carter administration.

But the fingers would be pointed in the wrong direction. The shah's own policies are responsible for the danger he faces, and policies of past American administrations are responsible for the dangers we face in the event of his downfall.

Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi has done a lot for the people of Iran in his 37 years as ruler. He emancipated women, redistributed land, doubled literacy, gave workers a share in industrial profits, improved health care and education and increased life expectancy from 35 years to 52. He used oil wealth to change Iran from a weak, backward state into an almost-modern regional power. But in some ways, he moved too far, too fast, and in others, he has done too little, too late. His modernization brought on social dislocation, inflation, corruption and ever-rising expectations. Meanwhile, his absolute dictatorship crushed traditional political forms, but failed to allow modern ones to develop.

The shah's rule was seriously threatened twice before. In 1953, he actually was forced to flee the country, but was brought back to power in a CIA-assisted coup that ousted the leftist-nationalist government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq. In 1963, the shah put down rightist rioters who opposed his land reforms and women's rights policies and exiled the religious leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, who is now his mortal enemy. Following the 1963 troubles, the shah began ruling ruthlessly as well as absolutely. His secret police, the SAVAK, became infamous around the world—and justifiably—for torture and oppression. The shah allowed only his own political party, emasculated Parliament, imposed rigid censorship on the press and appointed military tribunals to jail political suspects without legal niceties.

Also in the mid-1960s, the shah successfully demanded that the United States cut off embassy contact with all opposition elements, no matter how mild. According to some Iran scholars, this policy extended to the CIA station, which henceforth got its information exclusively from SAVAK. It is not clear which American officials instituted this policy, but the United States is reaping rotten fruit from it this year. The embassy has grossly underestimated the depth of resentment against the shah, the power of the religious elements and the charismatic force of the exiled Khomeini. "We have been as isolated as we allowed the Shah to become," one high-ranking official said.

For example, last week when American newspapers and television were concentrating on riots and burning buildings in Tehran, top American officials in Washington understood that the most dire threat to Iran actually lay in the general strike that shut down the country's oil fields. These officials were aware that the oil strikers were highly organized and well-coordinated, using similar tactics and leveling similar demands in widely separated places. The officials claimed to be suspicious about who might want to wreck the Iranian economy, but they confessed that the US embassy and the CIA were unable to provide any information about who was leading the workers.

A former top CIA official said: "There has been a massive intelligence failure in Iran. My old agency has struck out completely." Despite the presence of some 40,000 Americans in Iran, and close ties that US military and US arms suppliers maintain with the Iranian military, major US decision-makers seem to have no accurate information about what factions might exist in the army, how long it might remain loyal to the shah and how many orders to shoot civilians its discipline can stand.

The US government also seems to be in the dark about the ideas and intentions of Ayatollah Khomeini. Officials of the shah's government commonly brand him a right-wing obscurantist who would try to turn the country back from modernity and might plunge it into chaos or even civil war. However, some Iran scholars contend that his program and that of his followers would be reasonably progressive economically, certainly anti-Communist and nationalist, not pro-Soviet. Some of these scholars foresee a linkup between Khomeini and the military, the removal of the shah and the establishment of an "Islamic Republic" that would continue to need links to the West to operate its oil fields and industries. Such a regime almost certainly would cut off oil sales to Israel and might try to ban movies, dancing, gambling and Western dress for women. On the other hand, if Khomeini's most extreme followers exercise power, women might be banned from professions and public office, Jews and other minorities might be banished or brutalized and oil might be employed as a political weapon.

CONTINUED

For the United States, an Islamic Republic in Iran, particularly a military one, would not be ideal. But, the US government seems so cut off from the main actors in Iranian affairs (outside the shah's court and a thin layer of the country's elite) that it has little idea what real possibilities exist. American officials make no claim whatever to being able to influence events, which means they have no power to influence the people who will influence events, except for the shah. "It seems absolutely stupefying," an Iran scholar said, "but after all the money, people and effort we've put into that country, we don't know what's going on."

As a result, US government officials have been busy concocting scary scenarios for what might follow the shah's fall. These scenarios seem theoretically plausible, but their probabilities and implications are unknown. The favorites include military dictatorship, radical right-wing dictatorship, radical left-wing dictatorship and anarchy, which might or might not open the way for overt or covert Soviet involvement. Continued rule by the shah is clearly preferable to all of these, and so that is what the United States is for. The State Department is for it with the proviso that it should lead to a constitutional monarchy. Zbigniew

Brzezinski favors it, no matter what. The question is, can the shah actually survive? He has appointed a military government that is busy arresting former loyal servants of the shah, some on trumped-up charges, some for real offenses. It could be that the arrests will appease the shah's opposition, or it could be they will only serve to remind the country who's presided over the iniquities of the past.

Probably continued rule by the shah is the best available alternative we have. But it might have been better rule, and it might have had a better chance of survival, if the United States had been able to tell the shah that his old style of governance was going wrong. If he hadn't been willing to do something about it, at least we would have been able to cement relations with those likeliest to replace him. That would have been a *real* policy of *realpolitik*. As matters now stand, he's in danger of falling, and we're in danger of suffering for it. We're stuck with the shah, but we stuck ourselves. If the shah falls, it won't be the human rights advocates who lost Iran.

Morton Kondracke

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THE WASHINGTON POST
16 November 1978

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U.S. Studies Capabilities Of Migs Supplied to Cuba

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States has launched a high-priority intelligence study into the capabilities of Mig 23 warplanes recently supplied to Cuba by the Soviet Union, U.S. officials said yesterday.

It has not yet been determined whether the sophisticated jets are equipped in a way that would permit them to deliver nuclear weapons, the officials said. Some Mig 23s are capable of nuclear delivery.

There is so far no evidence, according to government sources, of the presence of nuclear weapons in Cuba.

A wary Carter administration, upset by the leak of a top-secret Pentagon memorandum on the subject to columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, limited itself yesterday to only the most sparing comment on the topic of the Migs.

If the warplanes do turn out to be of the nuclear-capable variety, this could be considered a violation of the 1962 U.S.-Soviet understanding that ended the Cuban missile crisis. At that time, the Russians withdrew ballistic missiles and IL28 bombers from Cuba in return for an end of the U.S. "quarantine" of the island and an understanding that the United States would not invade.

The 1962 understanding, which was studied and cited again by the Nixon administration when the Soviets appeared to be constructing a submarine base in Cuba in 1970, is not precise. But according to students of the full record, the thrust is clear that the Soviets are barred from placing "offensive weapons" in Cuba.

There is little doubt that a public argument with the Russians over whether the Mig 23s are permitted under the terms of 1962 agreement would be damaging to U.S.-Soviet relations and especially to the chances for Senate ratification of the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT) which is in final stages of negotiation.

The press leaks of sensitive information about the case were read by officials as indications that a secret resolution of the matter is probably impossible. The leaks caused special concern because they were taken as forerunners of many more to come.

in the highly charged debate over a controversial SALT II treaty.

The first report that the Mig 23 fighters were being supplied to Cuba by the Soviet Union came from Associated Press Pentagon correspondent Fred S. Hoffmann on Oct. 30. The Washington Post reported the following day, on the basis of its own inquiries, that intelligence reports of the shipments, apparently detected as freighters bearing big crates steamed toward Cuba, had caused concern but not alarm in the Pentagon hierarchy.

The concern was sharpened greatly by yesterday's Evans and Novak column, which quoted a top-secret memorandum of Oct. 23 from Defense Secretary Harold Brown to President Carter as saying that the Mig 23 deliveries present a problem of "high political sensitivity."

State Department spokeswoman Jill Schuker, in the only official statement on the subject, said "we have the matter under active investigation." Asked if the aircraft deliveries violate the 1962 understanding with the Soviets, she said, "We are actively pursuing the matter to develop the factual situation. We regard with the utmost seriousness understandings we have with the Soviet Union as well as with other countries."

Defense sources said the first signs of the Mig deliveries were noted over the summer. Some 12 to 15 aircraft are reported to be involved.

Cuba previously had been supplied with Mig 21 fighters, an aircraft widely exported by the Soviet Union. The Soviets have exported Mig 23 fighters to a number of Middle Eastern countries, but not in a configuration capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

Article appeared
on page A-10

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
16 November 1978

Did Soviet Shift Of MiGs to Cuba Break '61 Pact?

Associated Press

The State Department says it is investigating whether the presence of Soviet MiG-23 aircraft in Cuba violates a 16-year-old understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Spokeswoman Jill Schuker said yesterday that reports of Mig-23s in Cuba are under "active investigation," but she refused to say whether the subject has been discussed with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin or with the Cuban government.

"We are monitoring the situation very carefully; it is a matter of concern to us," she said.

The Associated Press reported Oct. 30 that 18 to 20 MiG-23s arrived in Cuba earlier in October. Some types of the jet are believed by U.S. intelligence officials to be capable of firing tactical nuclear weapons.

It was not known whether the new jets sent to Cuba were designed for ground attack as well as air defense.

In 1962, President John Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev agreed that the Soviets would not send nuclear weapons to Cuba and that the United States would not attack the island.

Defense Secretary Harold Brown has described the MiG-23 as one of several new types of Soviet warplanes that "have substantially better ranges and payloads than their predecessors."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
17 NOVEMBER 1978

U.S. Renews Spy Flights Over Cuba

New York Times News Service

The Carter administration, concerned over the presence of advanced Soviet military aircraft in Cuba, has resumed flying photo reconnaissance missions over the island.

Government officials said yesterday that the decision to order the U.S. Air Force's most sophisticated spy plane, the SR-71, back into action over Cuba was part of an effort to determine whether the stationing of Soviet-built MiG-23s violates the terms of a 1962 understanding between Washington and Moscow.

That understanding, concluded in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, prohibited the deployment of "offensive" weapons in Cuba.

The primary purpose of the overflights, officials said, is to find out whether the versions of the MiG-23s recently shipped could be used to deliver nuclear weapons against the United States. But they said the flights also were designed to give a signal to Moscow and Havana over how closely the administration is monitoring the situation.

OFFICIALS SAID that so far these flights and other means of intelligence had not yet enabled the administration to determine the precise characteristics of the MiG force.

In January 1977, shortly after he entered office, President Carter ordered a halt to intelligence over-

flights of Cuba, although this decision did not become public until Gen. Raul Castro, the chief of the Cuban armed forces and the prime minister's brother, disclosed several months later that the flights had been halted.

The flights, which had begun in the early 1960s, had been a source of irritation to Cuba's Communist government for years and Carter's move was meant to pave the way for normalizing relations between Washington and Havana.

(A delegation of U.S. senators visiting in Moscow said today that Premier Alexei Kosygin gave a "biting" response when Sen. Abraham Ribicoff, D-Conn., mentioned Soviet transfers of modern weaponry to Cuba. Sen. Paul Laxalt, R-Nev., said Kosygin replied that such things were not open for discussion and accused the senators of going into too much detail.)

Although officials refused to disclose when Carter ordered a resumption of the flights or how many missions have been flown, it is known that the MiGs first appeared in Cuba in July. One official said the administration had not resumed the regular and rather frequent pattern of flights ordered during the Nixon-Ford era, but that a mission conducted earlier this week had detected at least one MiG-23 parked on a Cuban airfield.

THE AIRCRAFT USED for the overflights, the SR-71, was first de-

ployed in the mid-1960s and replaced the much-publicized U-2 as the mainstay of the Air Force's reconnaissance fleet. Known as the Black Bird for its color and distinctive shape, the SR-71 is capable of flying at altitudes exceeding 125,000 feet, beyond the estimated range of Soviet-supplied surface-to-air missiles in Cuba.

One of the central reasons that Carter was able earlier to halt the reconnaissance mission, officials said, was that improved satellites provided photographic information of nearly equal quality. Accordingly, some intelligence officials suggested that the new SR-71 missions were mainly political in nature, designed to express American concern.

Other officials, however, disputed this and said that the flights were a necessary part of determining the exact capabilities of the MiG-23s. They said about 18 or so of the aircraft had been detected in recent months, but it was unclear whether the Cubans had received versions capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

CONTINUED

The problem as described by officials is that the Soviet Union in recent years has supplied two versions of the MiG-23 to its allies, an interceptor, known as the MiG-23E, and a ground-attack plane, called the MiG-23F or the MiG-27. The interceptor version is not capable of delivering nuclear bombs, but the ground-attack plane could be quickly reconfigured for this mission.

ACCORDINGLY, intelligence aides are interested in determining what version of the MiG-23 Cuba has been given. Several said it appeared that some ground-attack versions are now in Cuba, but no evidence suggests that they have been modified for a nuclear role.

While stressing their concern, officials are taking a cautious approach to the situation and they avoid comparing it to the 1962 crisis that was precipitated by Moscow's introduction of nuclear-armed missiles to Cuba. Officials said they were concerned not to allow the situation to interfere with the strategic arms talks and efforts to improve Soviet-American ties generally.

At the same time, senior aides said the White House was determined to uphold the 1962 understanding with

Moscow. In that accord, the United States pledged not to invade the island in return for Soviet restraint on "offensive weapons."

The accord, which exists in the form of an exchange of letters between President John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, was concluded in December 1962 and led Moscow to remove both missiles and Soviet IL-28 bombers from the island. Some officials pointed to the fact that the understanding covered bombers in arguing that the presence of the MiG-23s might constitute a violation.

MANY OFFICIALS compared the existing situation with Moscow's attempt in the late 1960s to begin moving nuclear submarines into the Cuban naval port of Cienfuegos. Viewed by the Nixon administration as a gradual effort to erode the 1962 understanding, Moscow, under American pressure, agreed in 1970 not to bring either nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed subs to Cuba.

Whether the administration is now seeking a similar arrangement with Moscow to cover the MiG-23s was unclear, but officials acknowledge that the issue has been raised in recent talks with Soviet leaders.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-11NEW YORK TIMES
17 NOVEMBER 1978

U.S. PHOTO FLIGHTS RESUME OVER CUBA

Carter Orders Air Reconnaissance
to Determine the Role of New
MIG's Sent by Moscow

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16 — The Carter Administration, concerned over the presence of advanced Soviet military aircraft in Cuba, has resumed photo reconnaissance flights over the island, Government officials said today.

The decision to order the Air Force's most sophisticated spy plane, the SR-71, back into action over Cuba, they said, was part of an effort to determine whether the stationing of MIG-23's there violated the terms of a 1962 understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union. That understanding, concluded in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, prohibited the deployment of "offensive" weapons in Cuba.

The main purpose of the overflights, the officials said, is to find out whether the versions of the MIG-23's that have appeared in Cuba since July could be used to deliver nuclear weapons against the United States. But they said the flights were also intended to show both Moscow and Havana how closely the Administration was monitoring the situation.

The problem as described by officials is that the Soviet Union in recent years has supplied two versions of the MIG-23 to its allies, an interceptor, known as the MIG-23E, and a ground-attack plane, called the MIG-23F or the MIG-27. The interceptor version is not capable of delivering nuclear bombs, but the ground-attack plane could be quickly modified to do so.

So far, officials said, the overflights and other means of intelligence had not yet enabled the Administration to determine the precise characteristics of the MIG force. Several said it appeared that some ground-attack versions of the MIG were now in Cuba, but no evidence suggested that they had been modified for a nuclear role.

In January 1977, shortly after he entered office, President Carter ordered a halt to intelligence overflights of Cuba. The flights, which had begun early in the 1960's, had been a source of irritation to Cuba's Communist Government and Mr. Carter's move was meant to pave the way for normalizing relations between Washington and Havana.

Officials refused to disclose when Mr. Carter ordered a resumption of the flights or how many missions had been flown.

THE WASHINGTON POST
17 November 1978

Article appeared
on page A-18

A New 'Cuban Missile Crisis'?

THE UNITED STATES is reacting with an appropriate attentiveness and calm to the Kremlin's delivery of Mig23 aircraft to Cuba. No public accusations against Moscow and Havana are being made, but the intelligence people are trying to figure out whether the planes are meant simply to improve Cuba's air defenses or to pay off Cuba for its cooperation with Soviet designs in Africa, or whether the planes are the kind of Mig23 that can be equipped to deliver nuclear weapons.

On the face of it, the latter suggestion is far-fetched. If the Soviet Union is heading in that direction, an immense crisis lies ahead, and Moscow surely knows it. To be moving toward giving Cuba a nuclear capability would not only be a politically and militarily unacceptable violation of the Soviet-American understanding that ended the Cuban missile crisis of 1962; in that understanding, Moscow agreed not to put "offensive weapons" in Cuba. More important, it would mark a staggering change in Moscow's prudent 20-year policy of not permitting its allies to acquire their own nuclear weapons—weapons that would give an ally the means to work Moscow into a crisis that Moscow itself could not control. In the 1950s, the Soviets aided China's nuclear program.

Once Peking and Moscow fell out, the Kremlin never went down that road again.

But if it seems far-fetched that Moscow would let Cuba edge down the nuclear road, then there is no denying the political complications that would flow from a perception by the American public that Moscow was doing so. That was apparently what Defense Secretary Harold Brown had in mind when he suggested, in a memo to the president leaked to the Evans and Novak column, that the Mig23 question was one of "high political sensitivity." The leak was a heavy breather, carrying ominous warnings that this case was about to blow the prospects for ratification of SALT. One can be forgiven for wondering if that was not precisely the purpose of the leak.

Already some political damage has been done. This gives the administration all the more reason to make a complete accounting to the public. If there is a real danger, it must be faced. If it is psychological warfare by opponents of a SALT agreement, that needs to be known, too. It remains to say only that the Kremlin, if its hands are clean, has its own good reason to help the administration demonstrate that this new "Cuban missile crisis" is a hoax.

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 4THE BALTIMORE SUN
14 November 1978

CIA man fired after leak to Jackson

From Wire Services

A Central Intelligence Agency analyst was fired last August after turning over copies of secret CIA reports on arms limitations to an aide to Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.), the aide said yesterday.

The analyst, David S. Sullivan, who now works for Senator Lloyd M. Bentsen, Jr. (D., Texas), declined to comment after the story of his firing was reported in the *New York Times*.

The Jackson aide, Richard Perle, confirmed the *Times* story, admitting he had received Mr. Sullivan's analysis of issues in the United States-Soviet efforts to conclude a new arms-limitation agreement. Mr. Perle, who has a top-secret security clearance, said the documents were returned later to the CIA.

Dale Peterson, a CIA spokesman, said the agency had no comment on the matter.

Mr. Jackson is chairman of the Senate Armed Services subcommittee on arms control and has been critical of the current negotiations.

The *Times* story quoted unidentified sources as saying Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of central intelligence, was outraged by what was termed Mr. Sullivan's insubordination. "Sullivan just didn't understand the gravity of what he'd done," Admiral Turner was quoted as saying.

The *Times* quoted officials as saying Admiral Turner had met at least twice with Senator Jackson since Mr. Sullivan left the agency last August 25, and urged him to dismiss Mr. Perle. One source was quoted as saying the admiral told the sen-

ator: "That's what we did on our end, and that's what you should do on your end."

Senator Jackson and Mr. Perle have apologized to Admiral Turner for their part in receiving the documents, according to the *Times* sources.

Senator Jackson, who was said late last week to be on vacation somewhere in California, could not be located for comment. Mr. Perle, reached yesterday at his home in Washington, refused to comment on his role. "I don't have anything to say," he said. "Frankly, I don't think there's much of a story."

One Senate aide familiar with the Sullivan case contended there was nothing out of the ordinary in a representative of the executive branch making such classified information available to a congressional aide.

"This sort of thing goes on all along," said the source, who declined to be named.

Article appeared
on page A-3

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
13 November 1978

Gave Arms Documents to Jackson Aide

CIA Analyst Forced Out After Passing Papers to Hill

New York Times News Service

NEW YORK — A strategic analyst for the CIA was forced to resign last summer after confessing he had supplied copies of top-secret CIA reports on strategic arms limitation talks to a key staff aide of Sen. Henry M. Jackson, a leading critic of the arms negotiations, administration, and intelligence sources said.

The analyst, David S. Sullivan, admitted passing the documents to Richard Perle, Jackson's aide for disarmament matters, after being ordered to take a lie detector test, the sources said. He now is working as an adviser on the arms talks and other issues for Sen. Lloyd Bentsen, D-Tex.

Stansfield Turner, director of Central Intelligence, was described by associates as being outraged by Sullivan's "insubordination" — as one official put it — as well as the decision of Jackson, D-Wash., and Perle, who have high security clearances, to receive the working-level documents.

THE MATERIALS included some of the government's most closely held information on sources and methods of obtaining information about the Soviet Union, officials said.

Some officials involved in the arms talks depicted Sullivan's act as an example of the kind of "hardball" — as one senior official said — that will be played next year over the pending ratification of a new agreement with the Soviet Union.

Others saw the CIA's decision not

to seek further sanctions against Sullivan, who recently was issued top-secret clearances by the departments of Defense and Energy, as an example of a double standard on the part of the Carter administration in so-called "whistle-blowing" cases, in which government employees make public what they consider to be wrongdoing or incompetence.

The administration filed a civil suit against Frank Snepp, a former CIA employee with a liberal point of view who wrote a book on his experiences in Vietnam without CIA clearance.

Turner has met at least twice with Jackson since Sullivan left the agency Aug. 25, officials said, and urged him to dismiss Perle.

"That's what we did on our end," one source quoted the admiral as telling the senator, in effect, "and that's what you should do on your end."

JACKSON AND PERLE have apologized to Turner for their part in receiving the documents, which were returned to the CIA, the sources said.

Jackson, who was said late last week to be on vacation somewhere in California, could not be located by a reporter for comment. Perle, reached yesterday, refused to comment. "I don't have anything to say," he said. "Frankly, I don't think there's much of a story."

One government official explained that Turner was unable to do more than dismiss Sullivan for insubordination and issue a letter of reprimand because no federal law had been violated.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-3NEW YORK TIMES
13 NOVEMBER 1978

C.I.A. Analyst Forced Out for Giving Senator Secret Data

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

A strategic analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency was forced to resign last summer after confessing that he had supplied copies of top-secret C.I.A. reports on strategic arms limitation talks to a key staff aide of Senator Henry M. Jackson, a leading Senate critic of the current arms negotiations, Administration and intelligence sources said.

The analyst, David S. Sullivan, admitted passing the documents to Richard Perle, Senator Jackson's aide for disarmament matters, after being ordered to take a lie detector test, the Government sources said. Mr. Sullivan now is working as an adviser on the arms talks and other issues for Senator Lloyd Bentsen, Democrat of Texas.

Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence, was described by associates as being outraged by Mr. Sullivan's "insubordination" — as one official put it — as well as the decision of Senator Jackson, Democrat of Washington, and Mr. Perle, who have high security clearances, to receive the working-level documents. The Sullivan materials included some of the Government's most closely held information on sources and methods of obtaining information about the Soviet Union, Government officials said.

In recent conversations, some officials involved in the arms limitation talks depicted Mr. Sullivan's act as an example of the kind of "hardball" — as one senior official said — that will be played next year over the pending ratification of a new arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union. Other officials saw the C.I.A.'s decision not to seek further sanctions against Mr. Sullivan, who recently was issued top-secret clearances by the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy, as an example of a double standard on the part of the Carter Administration in so-called "whistle-blowing" cases, in which Government employees make public what they consider to be wrongdoing or incompetence. The Administration chose to file a civil suit against Frank Snapp, a former C.I.A. employee with a liberal point of view who wrote a book on his experiences in Vietnam without C.I.A. clearance.

Jackson Urged to Dismiss Aide

Admiral Turner has met at least twice with Senator Jackson since Mr. Sullivan left the agency last Aug. 23, officials said, and urged him to dismiss Mr. Perle. "That's what we did on our end," one source quoted the Admiral as telling the Senator, in effect, "and that's what you should do on your end."

Senator Jackson and Mr. Perle have apologized to Admiral Turner for their part in receiving the documents, which

were returned to the C.I.A., the sources said.

Mr. Jackson, who was said late last week to be on vacation somewhere in California, could not be located by a reporter for comment. Mr. Perle, reached yesterday at his home in Washington, refused to comment on his role. "I don't have anything to say," he said. "Frankly, I don't think there's much of a story."

One Government official explained that Admiral Turner was unable to do more than dismiss Mr. Sullivan for insubordination and issue a subsequent letter of reprimand because no federal law had been violated by Mr. Sullivan's decision to pass the documents to Mr. Perle and Senator Jackson.

Debate on Ratification Expected

The Sullivan affair is widely known among top disarmament officials in the Carter Administration, who are now concluding negotiations with the Soviet Union on a new disarmament agreement. If such an agreement is reached by next year, there is expected to be a major debate on the issue when the accord comes up for ratification by the Senate.

The documents passed by Mr. Sullivan were described as analyses he had made of Soviet intentions regarding the strategic arms negotiations. Mr. Sullivan, who has told friends he worked four years on the papers, received permission last month from the C.I.A. to publish an unclassified version of his research. In one such paper, to be published in the Winter, 1978, edition of the magazine Strategic Review, Mr. Sullivan argues that "the Soviets have used the SALT negotiating process as a smokescreen behind which to conceal their increasing strategic superiority from a complacent U.S." SALT is the abbreviation used for the strategic arms limitation talks.

Mr. Sullivan further says that the United States has been losing ground strategically since 1963 in terms of the size of its nuclear arsenal compared to that of the Soviet Union, a retreat that he said was sanctioned in the arms limitation agreement in 1972 negotiated by President Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger, then Mr. Nixon's national security adviser.

Friends of Mr. Sullivan said in recent interviews that the former C.I.A. analyst is convinced that the classified materials he supplied to Senator Jackson and Mr. Perle contained proof — as gleaned from highly classified sources — that the Soviet Union deceived the United States during the 1972 negotiations and is continuing its deception in the current negotiations.

In turning over the materials to Mr. Jackson and Mr. Perle, the friends said, Mr. Sullivan understood that the two men would make use of the intelligence data

during the public debate on the expected new agreements next year.

Friends of Mr. Sullivan explain that the C.I.A. analyst, who is 35 years old, initially met Mr. Perle early this year during a seminar on strategic disarmament at the C.I.A. headquarters in Virginia. They subsequently became friends and it was to Mr. Perle that Mr. Sullivan brought his highly classified materials. The papers contained eight different codeword categories of intelligence above top secret.

Mr. Sullivan's view, as explained to his friends, is that he had become convinced that the C.I.A. was deliberately suppressing the intelligence data he had accumulated and analyzed because of Admiral Turner's reluctance to pursue viewpoints detrimental to a new treaty, one of President Carter's highest priorities in the next year.

Other Government officials noted that Mr. Sullivan's paper subsequently was published as a low-level working document by the C.I.A. and disseminated, on a narrowly restricted basis, to some members of the intelligence community. When top C.I.A. officials learned that Mr. Perle and Senator Jackson had unauthorized copies of the documents, Mr. Sullivan was ordered to take a lie detector test. Before doing so, however, sources said, Mr. Sullivan admitted what he had done to his superiors in the C.I.A.'s Office of Strategic Research.

Government officials said that Admiral Turner decided to dismiss Mr. Sullivan after discussing the issue with him on Aug. 24 and 25. The Admiral concluded, a source said, "that Sullivan just didn't understand the gravity of what he'd done." Before the Admiral had a chance to act during the meeting, the source added, Mr. Sullivan "pulled out a letter of resignation."

The C.I.A. perhaps could have taken more severe sanctions against Mr. Sullivan, the official added, but "to do more, they'd have to take on Jackson and they were afraid to do it."

THE WASHINGTON POST
14 November 1978

Article appeared
on page A-7

SALT Battle Apparently Has Started

By Charles R. Babcock

Washington Post Staff Writer

The battle over Senate ratification of a proposed strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT) seems to have started already.

A report in yesterday's New York Times described the resignation of a Central Intelligence Agency analyst who leaked secret information about allegedly deceptive Soviet intentions to an aide to Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), who has criticized some SALT proposals.

David S. Sullivan, the analyst, gave the material to Jackson aide Richard Perle because he feared his four-year study of the present arms treaty and negotiations would be suppressed by the CIA, according to a source who would be identified only as a friend of Sullivan's.

Sullivan could not be reached directly for comment.

The 35-year-old Sullivan went to work for Sen. Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tex.) shortly after leaving the CIA in late August. A spokesman for Bentsen said the senator was aware of the incident, but was satisfied that Sullivan had done nothing illegal.

Perle has top security clearances, and Sullivan has received top-secret Pentagon and Department of Energy clearances for his new job, the Bentsen spokesman said.

Sullivan also has received CIA permission to publish an unclassified version of his study, the spokesman added. It is said to conclude the Soviets continually have deceived the United States on SALT.

The American Committee on East-West Accord, an advocate of a SALT treaty, issued a statement yesterday criticizing Sullivan's reported action. "Selective leaks and misinformation can scuttle the president's efforts to bring the strategic arms race under control," co-director Carl Marcy said.

Marcy agreed it was possible that pro-SALT forces within the administration had leaked the story about Sullivan's anti-SALT leak to Jackson's aide. "You can expect leaks" from both sides, Marcy said.

The CIA, as usual, had no comment on the matter. A Justice Department spokesman said there was no sign the CIA had asked the department to consider prosecuting Sullivan. It is not clear that any statute would apply.

The CIA wasted no time asking the Justice Department to take action against Frank Snepp, a former officer who published a critical book—containing no classified information—without clearing it first with the agency.

Administration officials are in the final phase of negotiations with the Soviets on a new agreement to limit nuclear weapons. Any treaty is expected to face critical questioning by Jackson and others in the Senate approval process.

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CHICAGO TRIBUNE
12 November 1978

CIA spy case: Was it sellout or a put-on?

By John O'Brien

MIDWAY THROUGH his trial for espionage, the central question remains whether William Peter Kampiles was a traitor or a patriot.

A jury's verdict is not expected for another week, after the 23-year-old Chicagoan and former Central Intelligence Agency clerk certifies in defense of charges he handed over to the Russians a top secret manual of instructions for an American spy satellite.

Yet intriguing contrasts of characters and events in the strange case already have emerged—the least of which is Kampiles' admission that he did in fact meet clandestinely with a Soviet agent in Athens, Greece, as charged.

BUT THE PALE, shyly handsome CIA man turned self-styled spy for his country maintains he did so only as a lark to outfox "the Russians at their own game," according to defense attorney Michael Monico.

Kampiles has denied giving anything to the Russians except a spoof.

Indeed, the prosecution's own evidence, offered to the jury which is hearing the case in Hammon Federal Court, has shown it was Kampiles' disclosure of the meeting, given voluntarily and at his insistence, that first alerted American authorities to the fact that it had been held at all.

A SUBSEQUENT investigation by the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation led to the filing of charges against Kampiles. But the probe, in revealing that the spy satellite manual was missing, also turned up embarrassing evidence that 12 identical copies of the manual are "accounted for."

Of the contrasts that have come to light at trial, perhaps the most curious involves a copy of the full notebook-size manual, with its red stripe and "Top Secret" coding, and a 4th Century relic. It is said to contain a few ounces of the bodily fluids of St. Demetrius, the martyred military patron saint of Greece.

Both the manual and the relic are in the trial courtroom of Judge Phil McNaghy, separated in distance by only a few feet, but in time by centuries.

TWO FEDERAL marshals stand guard over the manual. It rests on an evidence exhibit table directly behind Kampiles' chair, and where Monico and Marvin Bloom, another defense lawyer, sit.

Kampiles carries the relic in his coat pocket for luck. He received it wrapped in tinfoil from a relative on the first day of his trial last Monday. Judge McNaghy has allowed its presence on one condition: Kampiles must surrender it when returned to his cell each night.

A second contrast is drawn from the popular notion that all Russians are hulking brutes. Not so in the case of the Soviet military attaché to whom Kampiles is accused of delivering the spy manual for \$3,000 last March.

The attaché, identified as Michael Zavali, a major, is short, thin man of 32 whose eyelids flutter uncontrollably when he thinks, who dresses impeccably, and drives a Fiat. The description was furnished by Zavali's counterpart, American Lt. Col. Dwight Beach, who testified he has had frequent social contact with Zavali at diplomatic parties in Athens.

ANOTHER CONTRAST, perhaps the most disappointing for courtroom spectators anxious for a "James Bond" thriller to emerge, came when prosecutor, David T. Ready, revealed his case rested entirely on Kampiles' admissions. There would be, said Ready, no witnesses to say they followed the suspect to Greece, or saw him meet with Major Zavali.

There is, however, an attractive, if not mysterious, woman in the courtroom. She is Sylvia Felecos, a 23-year-old English teacher with long red hair, who admits to being a "friend" of Kampiles.

But to other questions from reporters covering the trial, she merely smiles and remains silent.

THE WASHINGTON POST
14 November 1978

Article appeared
on page A-6

Spy Trial Told of Rendezvous Plans

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

HAMMOND, Ind.—The instructions for another rendezvous might have been dreamed up by John le Carre.

According to undisputed testimony at the spy trial of former CIA officer William Kampiles in U.S. District Court here, he was to have gone back to Greece last summer to meet his Soviet contact, but only after following an elaborate script.

First, he was to have sent a coded "Happy Birthday" message to the Russian contact at a so-called "accommodation address" in Athens which the officer, Soviet military attache Michael Zavali, had provided him. If Kampiles had written "Happy Birthday . . . I'm well . . ." that would have meant he was coming. "I'm not well" would have meant he couldn't make it.

Once back in Athens, where he first met "Michael" last winter, Kampiles was to have gone to the Athens Stadium, made his way up a cobblestone path to a certain telephone pole and stuck a thumbtack in it.

The tack, jurors here have been told, would have been the clandestine

signal to "Michael" to meet Kampiles in person the following Saturday night at a nearby pizzeria in the Greek capital.

Testifying yesterday at Kampiles' espionage trial here, an FBI counter-intelligence expert, Cornelius G. Sullivan, said the intricate arrangements strongly suggested that Kampiles was a full "recruited agent" after his first meetings with "Michael" last winter.

The government contends that he sold the Russians a top-secret manual on the KH11 spy satellite on that first trip for \$3,000.

Kampiles has pleaded not guilty, contending through his lawyer that he "conned" the Russians out of their money by promising them important American secrets without actually giving them any.

But FBI agent Sullivan said the fact that the Russians had provided him with "an accommodation address" (to which to send the birthday card), a "signal site" (the telephone pole) and a "meeting site" (the pizzeria) clearly signified that Kampiles had already been hired by the other side.

Under cross-examination by Kampiles' defense counsel, Michael Monico, the FBI agent also held firmly to

his view that the Russians would never have paid Kampiles the \$3,000 he acknowledges he got from them without receiving solid information in return.

"The Soviets are very pragmatic, cynical people," Sullivan testified. "They will not buy a pig in a poke."

In other testimony yesterday, a Central Intelligence Agency official who once won a medal for his work on the KH11 said that loss of the top-secret manual to the Russians could compromise its effectiveness. Leslie C. Dirks, the CIA deputy director for science and technology, said that one page of the document describes the limitations in the satellite's geographic coverage and another page provides an example of the quality of the photographs.

Dirks, who won a distinguished intelligence medal from the CIA for his contributions to the KH11 system, said that knowledge of the geographic limitations could put the Soviet Union in a position to avoid the satellite's surveillance altogether and knowledge of the quality of its photographs could enable the Soviets to devise effective camouflage.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-8WASHINGTON STAR
10 NOVEMBER 1978

Lax CIA Security Cited in Secret Document Sale Case

HAMMOND, Ind. (UPI) — A CIA executive has described lax security measures at the agency's headquarters in testimony at the trial of a former spy agency employee accused of selling secrets to the Russians.

Kevin Donoghue, the CIA's deputy chief of technical services, testified yesterday that it was not difficult for employees to remove documents from the Langley headquarters complex when William Kampiles, 23, worked there in 1977.

Kampiles, of Munster, Ind., is accused of selling Soviet agents a technical manual on a secret spy satellite. The manual allegedly was sold to the Soviets in Athens, Greece, in March for \$3,100.

Under cross-examination by Kampiles' lawyer, Donoghue said CIA workers were not searched or checked while leaving the building and that many took classified documents out to work on them at home.

THE DEFENSE introduced a

memo issued in June by CIA Director Stansfield Turner citing repeated violations of security procedures and warning they would no longer be tolerated.

Donoghue, who headed the section to which Kampiles was assigned as a watch officer during his brief tenure with the CIA, said the agency ran background checks and security clearances on its workers and tended to trust them.

He said Kampiles had access to a missing copy of the secret technical manual allegedly sold to the Soviets.

Donoghue was questioned about four copies of manual on the KH-11 satellite, which he handled.

He said he received a copy — No. 153 — of the first version of the plans in June 1975. In December 1976, Donoghue said, he got copies No. 154, 155 and 156. Copies 155 and 156 were placed in safes and No. 154 was put into a binder, replacing No. 153.

In April 1977, he said, No. 155 was moved upstairs to a room where Kampiles had access to it.

DONOGHUE SAID he burned copy No. 153 after receiving the updated version, but did not make a report on his action until last Aug. 17, the day of Kampiles' arrest, when he was asked to account for all copies in his possession.

Under cross-examination, Donoghue said he failed to follow CIA procedures in destroying the outdated copy. Procedure required a witness to the burning and immediate reporting of its destruction.

FBI agent James Murphy testified Wednesday that Kampiles told investigators two days before his arrest he gave Russian agents "disinformation" in an effort to convince CIA officials he could be used as an agent. The next day he changed his story and admitted taking the secret document, the agent said.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 3CHICAGO TRIBUNE
10 November 1978

Employees broke CIA rules: witness

By John O'Brien

A WITNESS in the trial of William Kampiles, a 23-year-old Chicagoan charged with espionage, admitted Thursday that some employees of the Central Intelligence Agency removed classified documents from CIA headquarters in violation of security rules.

Kevin J. Donoghue, a CIA official, testified in federal court in Hammond that he himself did not follow security rules when he destroyed another copy of the same spy satellite manual that Kampiles is accused of handing over to the Russians in Athens earlier this year.

Under stiff cross examination by defense attorney Michael Monico, Donoghue conceded that a number of CIA employees had routinely taken documents home with them for "work related purposes" until the CIA ordered the practice halted on July 11. He said that at that time, Admiral Stansfield Turner, CIA director, issued an order prohibiting the practice and denounced it as a "flagrant violation of security."

DONOGHUE further testified that on Aug. 24, seven days after Kampiles' arrest, he conducted a fruitless, day-long search for manual copy 155, which Kampiles is accused of selling to the Soviets for \$3,000.

Donoghue said he wasn't aware that the document was missing until that time. The prosecution contends that Kampiles removed it shortly before he quit his clerk's job with the CIA in November, 1977.

In December, 1976, Donoghue said, he destroyed copy 153 of the manual because, he said, the manual was to be revised. He said he simply ripped the copy up with his hands, tossed the pieces into a so-called "burn bag," and then dropped the bag into an incinerator chute.

He admitted that no one else either

witnessed nor supervised the destruction of the manual, and said he made no record of the destruction until August 24.

"IF PEOPLE were going around destroying documents and not making a record of that," Monico asked, "then you couldn't have much security, could you?"

Donoghue—"You wouldn't have much accountability, not security. There is a difference."

Q—"If you don't follow the rules, you don't have much security, do you?"

A—"That is correct."

Q—"If you had been accused of taking copy 153 home and not reporting its destruction, wouldn't you have had difficulty in proving you didn't take the document?"

A—"That would be true."

In earlier testimony, James K. Murphy, an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who said Kampiles confessed to him selling the document to the Russians, denied the confession had been coerced.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A35

THE NEW YORK TIMES
12 November 1978

SPY TRIAL FOCUSING ON SECURITY IN C.I.A.

Testimony Discloses 17 Copies of
Technical Manual on Satellite
Were Not Accounted For

By NATHANIEL SHEPPARD Jr.

Special to The New York Times

HAMMOND, Ind., Nov. 11 — The espionage trial of a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency resumes here Monday with its focus now directed at the agency itself as the result of embarrassing courtroom disclosures of lax security for top-secret documents at C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va.

The defendant, 23-year-old William Peter Kampiles, is accused of stealing a technical manual describing the KH-11 spy satellite and selling it to a Soviet intelligence agent in Athens for \$3,000. Mr. Kampiles worked as a trainee at the agency from March through November 1977.

The satellite is said to be so sophisticated that it can produce legible photographs of billboards from hundreds of miles in space and, unlike other satellites, transmit pictures back to earth in coded signals. The Government has said that possession of the manual by foreign powers would allow them to devise defenses against the satellite.

Good Faith Payment

Michael Monico, a former Assistant United States Attorney who is Mr. Kampiles's lawyer, will argue that the defendant did not give any documents to the Soviet agent other than a phony identification card and that the \$3,000 he received from the agent was a form of "good faith" payment to win him over. He will also try to establish that Mr. Kampiles "is a very patriotic man who longed for excitement and a chance to prove his potential worth as an undercover agent."

The most damaging testimony against Mr. Kampiles so far in the four-day-old trial at Federal District Court here came from James K. Murphy, a special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He testified that the defendant confessed his guilt during interrogation at F.B.I. headquarters in Washington.

"I told him that I did not believe his original story because of some inconsistencies," Mr. Murphy told the court. "Then he cupped his hands over his face and after a moment said, 'You are right, I didn't tell the truth, I sold the secret documents to the Russians.'"

Mr. Monico said he would show that the confession had been made under duress and alleged threats by F.B.I. agents to make trouble for Mr. Kampiles's relatives if he did not confess.

Focus on Security

Except for the testimony by Mr. Murphy and two "expert witnesses," the main focus of the trial has been on the quality of security for top-secret documents at C.I.A. headquarters.

During the first day of the trial before Judge Phil McNaghy Jr., it was disclosed in government documents requested by the defense attorney that 17 other copies of the KH-11 technical manual could not be accounted for. The Government has since accounted for four of the missing manuals.

Later, Mr. Monico read from an agency-wide memorandum from Adm. Stansfield Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence, to all agency employees. The July 2 memorandum said in part: "In recent months evidence has mounted that many employees are removing agency documents from their office environment and taking them home for work related purposes. This practice is a flagrant and deliberate violation of agency security regulations and must be stopped immediately."

Mr. Monico read from the memorandum after his cross-examination of Kevin J. Donoghue, a C.I.A. deputy chief of the technical forces group who had responsibility for four copies of the technical manual, including copy 153, which Mr. Kampiles is accused of stealing.

Violation of Rules

In the cross-examination, Mr. Donoghue said that he destroyed a copy of the KH-11 manual in December 1976 but, in violation of agency rules, did so without witnesses and made no record of the destruction until August 1978, after he had been directed to account for the copies entrusted to him.

He also acknowledged that many clerks and employees other than Mr. Kampiles had access to the technical manual because a copy was kept in an unlocked file cabinet and sometimes on desk tops.

The defense sought to undercut the testimony of another major witness, Paul H. Corscadden, a C.I.A. deputy chief who also was Mr. Kampiles's supervisor. The defense tried to characterize him as an aging man in a dead-end job bent on destroying Mr. Kampiles's career because he was jealous of his alleged sexual prowess.

On direct examination, Mr. Corscadden said he had twice told Mr. Kampiles that he was receiving unfavorable comments from his co-workers and his future with the agency could become jeopardized if he did not improve his performance. On cross-examination by Mr. Monico, Mr. Corscadden acknowledged that the unfavorable comments were office rumors about Mr. Kampiles's sexual life, which he called "the legend of Billy."

Told About Social Life

"Is it not true that F.B.I. agents told you they were investigating an espionage case against Mr. Kampiles but the first thing you saw fit to tell them was about his social life?" Mr. Monico asked. "Yes," Mr. Corscadden replied.

"In your opinion, did the conduct of young people at a party bear on their ability to become competent officers?" Mr. Monico asked. "Only to the degree their co-workers were willing to trust and accept them," Mr. Corscadden replied.

Frequently in espionage trials involving top secret or sensitive material, there is controversy over whether that material should be made a part of the record of the trial and thus available to anyone.

Judge McNaghy sidestepped that problem in this case and established a new principle by ruling that only the attorneys, jury and expert witnesses would be allowed to view the KH-11 technical manual and that it would not be made a part of the official record. The length of the trial is unclear because many witnesses remain to be called.

THE WASHINGTON POST
10 November 1978

Article appeared
on page B-19

CIA Security on Classified Papers Lax, Trial Is Told

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

HAMMOND, Ind.—CIA employees have been taking classified documents home with them in "flagrant and deliberate violation" of the agency's security rules for a long time, a federal court jury was told here yesterday.

Defense lawyers for spy suspect William P. Kampiles emphasized the lax practices in U.S. District Court here where Kampiles is standing trial on espionage charges. He is accused of having stolen a top secret spy satellite manual while he was a CIA employee and then selling it to a Soviet agent on a trip to Athens last winter.

Kampiles has pleaded not guilty, insisting that he "conned" \$3,000 from a Soviet military attache named Michael Zavall by simply pretending to let the Russians enlist him.

With a CIA official on the witness stand, Kampiles' defense lawyer, Michael Monico, tried to suggest to the jurors that the document he is accused of peddling—a red-and-white technical manual on the KH11 spy satellite—may have been removed by someone else or possibly destroyed.

The witness, Kevin Donoghue, a deputy chief in the CIA operations center where Kampiles once worked, acknowledged that he himself had destroyed an early edition of the KH11 manual in December of 1976 without following CIA rules calling for the presence of two witnesses.

"What if you'd been accused of taking that document home and you couldn't produce it? You'd have a difficult time proving you didn't [destroy it], wouldn't you?" Monico asked him.

"Yes, I would," Donoghue conceded. He acknowledged that CIA Director Stansfield Turner sent a memorandum to agency officials July 11 of this year complaining that "many" employees are removing agency documents from their office environments

and taking them home for work-related purposes."

"This practice," the Stansfield continued, "is a flagrant and deliberate violation of agency security regulations and must be stopped immediately."

Special passes are now required for parcels carried out of CIA headquarters.

The CIA did not realize one of the operations center's three copies of the KH11 technical manual was missing until FBI agents extracted a confession from Kampiles on Aug. 15, a confession he is now contending was "coerced."

Donoghue was the CIA official in charge of the three copies the operations center received in December 1976 replacing the earlier edition which he said he burned. Donoghue said two were kept on the sixth floor where he worked, while one was sent upstairs where watch officers such as Kampiles were employed.

The government contends it is that copy, No. 155, that Kampiles hid under his sports jacket and later sold to the Soviet Union.

Donoghue conducted the CIA's search for No. 155 on Aug. 17, the same day FBI agents arrested Kampiles at his apartment in Munster,

Ind. The CIA official said he looked in file cabinets, desks and drawers in the 7th-floor operations center suite. However, under cross-examination, Donoghue said he did not ask anyone who worked there when they had last seen the document.

There have been suggestions from former CIA officials that junior officers such as Kampiles never should have had access to such documents. But Donoghue said that watch officers in the operations center needed the manual to know whether the satellite could supply required photographs for their part of the world.

In its fourth day, the trial also produced some insights into CIA personnel practices. Paul Corscadden, a former

deputy director of the operations center, said he told the 23-year-old Kampiles in the late spring of 1977 and again in late summer that there had been "some rather unfavorable comments" about him from fellow employees and improvement was needed.

Defense lawyer Monico charged that Kampiles had been held to account primarily for extracurricular activities, such as advances he was said to have made during a party to two young women who worked in the operations center. Corscadden denied passing that story on to FBI agents last month, but he said he did tell them of one question Kampiles had reportedly asked another CIA employee about his recent sexual successes.

"So you remember that?" Monico demanded.

"It was part of the legend of Bill Kampiles," Corscadden replied.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 43

NEWSWEEK
20 November 1978

Periscope

THOSE MISSING CIA MANUALS

The trial of William Kampiles, a former CIA employee charged with stealing a top-secret satellite manual and selling it to a Soviet agent, has embarrassed the CIA with the disclosure in court that twelve other copies of the same manual are missing. Now there is further discomfiture: a few of the lost manuals have been found, but it develops that one of those still missing was signed out to the office of the CIA director and it was never returned. That copy of the 85-page manual was checked out of the files at a time in 1976 when George Bush was CIA director, but it was not signed out to the director himself. There is another puzzle: the security sleuths can't find any record showing that the book in question was ever received by the director's office.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-18

NEW YORK TIMES
15 NOVEMBER 1978

Around the Nation

Admission by a C.I.A. Aide Alleged in Espionage Trial

HAMMOND, Ind., Nov. 14 (AP) — An agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation testified today that a former Central Intelligence Agency clerk, William Kampiles, had admitted stealing a top secret document and selling it to a Russian agent in Greece six months later for \$3,000.

Donald Stuke, the F.B.I. agent, provided many of the same details of the alleged confession that another agent, James Murphy, described to a Federal court jury last week.

Mr. Kampiles, 23 years old, is accused of espionage. The Government says that he stole the operating manual for a satellite surveillance system that can monitor the movement of foreign troops and equipment.

Mr. Stuke said that Mr. Kampiles had told of going to the Soviet Embassy in Athens in February 1978 and making initial contact with the Russians to trick them into believing he would help them. The defendant said that his real motive was to become a C.I.A. double agent, according to Mr. Stuke.

The defense says that Mr. Kampiles was coerced into confessing because the authorities had threatened to implicate his mother, who lives in Chicago, and his relatives in Greece.

THE WASHINGTON POST

15 November 1978

Article appeared
on page A-6

Trial Is Told FBI Had Eye on Others Before Kampiles

By George Lardner Jr.

Washington Post Staff Writer

HAMMOND, Ind.—The FBI already had been investigating reports that the government's KH11 spy satellite system had been compromised when it stumbled across William Kampiles, a federal court jury was told yesterday.

Testifying at Kampiles' espionage trial here, FBI counterintelligence expert Donald E. Stukeley acknowledged under cross-examination that the bureau had "other suspects" in mind before the 23-year-old Kampiles, a former CIA watch officer, suddenly came to official attention.

Defense attorneys carried the questioning no further. U. S. District Court Judge Phil M. McNaghy had ordered them at a secret hearing yesterday morning not to ask how the government learned the KH11's secrets might have been lost to the Soviets.

The judge told reporters during a recess that he did not regard that line of questioning as relevant. He also said that "national security" was a factor in his ruling.

It appeared, however, that the early FBI investigation, and the secrecy attached to it, might have some connection with the KH11's capabilities and Soviet efforts to thwart them.

According to testimony at the trial, now in its second week, the sophisticated satellite system reportedly carried an ultrasecret classification known as "UMBRA."

If it was so labeled, sources say, the KH11 might be able to perform electronic eavesdropping—on Soviet long-distance telephone calls, for example—as well as photographic reconnaissance.

When first interviewed by FBI and CIA officials Aug. 14 at the Twin Bridges Marriott in suburban Virginia, Kampiles told them that the KH11 manual he remembered seeing at the CIA had some pages marked "Top-Secret UMBRA."

Government prosecutors, however, have done their best to play down that recollection and have suggested that Kampiles may have been mistaken. The only copies of the KH11 manual introduced in evidence at the trial are marked "Top Secret ROUGH."

In testimony earlier this week, the CIA's deputy director for science and technology, Leslie Dirks, explained the distinction. The code-word "ROUGH," he said, is a special security designation for photographic reconnaissance work. The UMBRA designation is reserved for "non-photographic" intelligence information, "specifically communications intelligence," Dirks said.

One source said that an UMBRA designation would mean that the KH11 can not only photograph Soviet missile sites from 100 miles up, but can also gather electronic intelligence for the National Security Agency, primarily by picking up microwave signals and relaying them back to earthbound monitoring stations.

Long-distance telephone calls, this source observed, are carried by microwave.

In his testimony yesterday, FBI agent Stukeley, who directed the Kampiles investigation as chief of a Washington-based counterintelligence squad, said the only two copies of the KH11 manual he had ever seen carried no UMBRA label. Examining one on the witness stand yesterday, he said every page was marked simply "Top Secret ROUGH: No-for" (the last word standing for "No Foreign Dissemination," not even to friendly foreign intelligence services).

Kampiles has been accused of stealing Copy No. 155.66 of the KH11 Manual from the CIA operations center while he was working there last year and selling it to the Soviets for \$3,000 on a trip to Athens last winter.

Subsequently, U.S. intelligence officials reportedly noticed Soviet efforts to avoid the KH11's monitoring and an FBI investigation of the suspected leak was launched.

Kampiles came to the government's attention belatedly in August, months after he had told an old CIA colleague he had been in touch with the Soviets in Athens and wondering if the CIA might be able to use him as a double agent.

In his Aug. 14 interview, Kampiles mentioned his access to KH11 information, but denied telling the Soviets about it, Stukeley testified.

The FBI agent said Kampiles broke down and confessed the next day in a follow-up session that he had sold the documents to a Soviet agent named "Michael." Stukeley recalled showing Kampiles a hard-cover copy, even though it was not precisely like the one Kampiles had mentioned.

"Mr. Kampiles looked at me and said, 'That's it,'" Stukeley testified. "I handed him the document. He leafed through it and said, 'That's it. That's the one I gave Michael.'"

The government concluded its case with Stukeley denying under cross-examination that anyone had threatened Kampiles or intimidated him with threats against his family.

After a tearful hallway reunion with her son, Kampiles' 63-year-old mother, Nicoleta, took the witness stand yesterday afternoon as the defense began presenting its case. She said she regularly looked through her son's dresser after he moved back in with her last year and never saw anything like the KH11 manual he allegedly kept in one of the drawers.

"I tell the truth and that's the truth. I never see this," she told defense attorney Michael D. Monico after thumbing through a red-and-white covered copy.

Mrs. Kampiles said her son did bring \$3,000 back from Greece last winter, but she said he told her he got it from "a wealthy woman" he met.

Prosecutor James Richmond alluded to an Aug. 28 FBI interview with Mrs. Kampiles concerning what her son had told her.

"Didn't you tell those agents that he kept saying, 'Don't bother me. I know what I'm doing'?" Richmond asked Mrs. Kampiles.

"No, no," she insisted.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 5CHICAGO TRIBUNE
15 November 1978

Ex-CIA agent's defense in spy case hit by FBI

By John O'Brien

AN AMERICAN counterintelligence expert has testified that he believes William Peter Kampiles lied when he said a Soviet military attache paid him \$3,000 in return for only a promise to deliver United States defense secrets.

"It wouldn't happen—the Soviets would not pay \$3,000 without receiving positive information [and only if] they had a chance to assess its value," said Cornelius Sullivan, a Federal Bureau of Investigation section chief for counterintelligence activities in Washington.

Kampiles, 23, a former Central Intelligence Agency clerk from Chicago, is charged with selling a top-secret manual of instructions on the workings of the KH-11 American Spy Satellite, designed to monitor Russian missile silos and other military targets.

THE TRIAL IS in its second week before a jury in the courtroom of federal Judge Phil McNaghy in Hammond.

Sullivan referred to Kampiles' claim that he was only out to "play a game on the Russians" when he said he persuaded the attache last March in Athens, Greece, to give him the \$3,000. Kampiles' attorneys maintain their client met with the Soviet, Major Michael Zavali of the Russian military secret police, merely as a "lark."

"They [Soviets] won't buy a 'pig in a poke'—they won't buy on a promise," Sullivan testified Monday. "The Soviets [spies] are a very practical, pragmatic, and cynical people."

THE DEFENSE contends Kampiles' meetings with Zavali began when he attended a party in the Russian Embassy in Athens, had a few drinks, and pretended to be an American defector.

The strategic importance of the spy satellite manual was underscored by the testimony of Leslie Dirks, deputy director for CIA Science and Technology, who said the orbiting satellite is closely linked to the success of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

Dirks, whose job includes briefing the President and Congress on defense secrets, said the satellite serves as a guarantee "that the Russians live up to SALT agreements." Asked what the Russians might do to foil the satellites' sophisticated cameras, Dirks told prosecutor David Ready, "They probably roll their aircraft into hangars when the satellite passes overhead and use camouflage techniques."

IT WAS DURING Dirks' testimony that the name of a former CIA official—John Paisley, found shot to death Oct. 3 in Chesapeake Bay—was mentioned by defense attorney Michael Monico. Earlier, Monico had obtained permission from Judge McNaghy to review Paisley's CIA personnel file.

On cross-examination, Dirks admitted Paisley had clearance to review KH-11 satellite information.

Another CIA witness, Ray Hart, a security officer, said that since 1976 he has briefed nearly 1,000 CIA employees on the KH-11 project, including Kampiles.

*Sale of Secrets to Soviets***U.S. Wraps Up Case
Against Ex-CIA Clerk**

HAMMOND, Ind. (AP) — The government has completed its espionage case against William Kampiles after an FBI agent told the federal court jury that the former CIA clerk confessed to him Aug. 15.

The defense called several character witnesses and was expected to complete its case late today.

Kampiles, 23, is accused of stealing the top-secret operating manual for a surveillance satellite system and selling it to a Russian Embassy official in Athens.

The system is said to be capable of monitoring the movement of foreign troops and equipment by photographing them from outer space.

Donald Stuke, the second FBI agent to describe the confession, said yesterday that Kampiles admitted taking the document while Kampiles worked at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., last year, keeping it for about six months, then selling it to the Russians for \$3,000 in cash.

THE DEFENDANT'S mother, Nicoleta Kampiles, told the jury that her son went to Greece — where his parents were born — on five occasions. When he returned from a trip to Athens last February and March, she said he gave her \$3,000 in cash that he said a woman had given him so he could return to Greece later. She said she put the money in their bank account.

Stuke said the FBI had been investigating the possible compromise of the operating manual for the system, known as the KH-11, but said Kampiles was not a suspect before he was interviewed for the first time Aug. 14, 1978.

Kampiles said he had gone to Athens last February and returned in March, Stuke said. He said Kampiles told him that he met with Soviet officials four times, and tricked them into believing that he still worked for

the CIA and had access to top-secret documents.

Stuke said Kampiles told him that the Russians gave him \$3,000, and he promised to return to the United States, photograph valuable documents, and return with the film.

"I told him I'd never known the Soviets to give anyone money without a document," Stuke said. "I said I believed he had given them a document."

THE NEXT DAY, Kampiles changed his story, the agent said.

"You were right. I did give them a document. It dealt with the KH-11," Stuke said Kampiles told him.

"He said he obtained it from the CIA while he was employed there" from March to November 1977, Stuke said. "He said there were other top-secret documents there, but that seemed to be the most interesting one. He said he didn't think this document would put the Soviets ahead by leaps and bounds."

The defense has contended that Kampiles was coerced into confessing, but Stuke said he knew of no threats or promises made to Kampiles.

The defense has pictured Kampiles as a young man who wanted to be a spy for the CIA, and thought that if he tricked the Russians into believing that he was on their side the CIA would hire him as a double agent.

Article appeared
on page A-3

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
16 November 1978

Former CIA Clerk Denies Selling Secret to Soviets

HAMMOND, Ind. (AP) — Former CIA clerk William Kampiles says he convinced a Soviet official named "Michael" that he could steal classified documents at will but denied that he actually sold him a top-secret satellite manual.

Kampiles, 23, testified at his federal court trial yesterday that he passed no information to the official he identified several times only as "Michael."

The government has accused Kampiles of stealing a copy of a technical manual for the KH-11 satellite surveillance system, which monitors foreign troop and equipment movements by photographing them from outer space. The government said he sold the manual to a Soviet embassy official during a trip to Greece earlier this year.

Kampiles, who had worked for the CIA from March to November 1977, said he was in Athens in February and March visiting relatives, and that he had four meetings with Michael.

He said he convinced the official that he still worked for the CIA, that he had access to top-secret material and that he would steal it for the Soviets.

The defense contends that Kampiles hoped the CIA would rehire him as a double agent if he fooled the Russians into thinking he was on their side.

Throughout the trial, questions have been raised about the CIA's internal security. Defense attorney Michael Monico read a letter yesterday from Theodore Anderson, acting chief of the special security center of the CIA. The letter, dated Nov. 1, 1978, and addressed to the director of security, says 16 of 349 copies of the satellite manual are unaccounted for, including 13 assigned to the CIA.

FBI agents have said that Kampiles confessed that he gave Michael the manual and was paid \$3,000. But Kampiles' lawyer contends his client was coerced into confessing.

THE WASHINGTON POST
16 November 1978

Article appeared
on page A-1, 4

Suspect Swears He Gave Soviets Only an ID Card

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

HAMMOND, Ind. — Almost mumbling his words in a hoarse, flat monotone, former Central Intelligence Agency officer William Kampiles swore yesterday that the only document he ever gave the Soviets was a fake CIA identification card.

Taking the witness stand on his own behalf, Kampiles denied charges that he sold a top-secret manual on the KHI spy satellite to a Soviet agent, and insisted that he never even took the document home with him, as the government has charged.

His chief defense counsel, Michael D. Monico, sought to underscore the testimony by reading to the jury the results of a CIA inventory showing that as of Nov. 1, 1978, 17 other copies of the manual could not be accounted for, including one that had been checked out to the director of central intelligence. (The number of missing copies has since been reduced to 13.)

Kampiles, 23, has been accused of espionage for allegedly stealing a copy from the CIA's round-the-clock Operations Center, where he worked last year, and then selling it to the Soviets on a trip to Athens last February.

Describing his short-lived career at the CIA as a drab exercise in 12-hour shifts in a single room, Kampiles said all he took with him when he left the agency last November was a blank identification card he had somehow come across.

"It was just a souvenir, something to remember the CIA by," he testified. "I think I may have shown it to some friends."

Kampiles, however, no longer has the card. He said he gave it to a Soviet agent named Michael Zavali in Athens last winter in an effort to prove to Zavali that he was still with the CIA. By then, Kampiles said, he had doctored the card with a photo, his signature, an expiration date of 1980, and the fake countersignature of some CIA security officer.

The spy suspect, who said he always wanted to be an undercover agent for the CIA in Greece, insisted that his maneuver impressed "Michael" and his superiors enough for the Soviets to pay him \$3,000 and promise \$10,000 per trip for future deliveries of secret documents.

Kampiles was not asked why he would have let the Soviets keep his CIA identification card or why they would want to keep it when they expected him to go back to CIA headquarters and start spying on their behalf. Government prosecutors will not begin cross-examination until after the defense completes its questioning today.

The impact of Kampiles' testimony was also somewhat diluted by the account of another witness called by the defense, Anastasia Thamakos, a scheduling specialist for the International Communications Agency (formerly the U.S. Information Agency).

A Washington friend and sort of patroness of young Kampiles, she said he told her of clandestine contacts with a Soviet agent in Athens shortly after his return from the trip in March.

"I was rather amused," she testified. "I thought it was one of his little fantasies. He's always creating stories."

Thamakos said Kampiles told her by telephone from Chicago last March of meeting some foreigner on his February flight to Athens. By this rather garbled account, she said it appeared that Kampiles had told the foreigner he was hoping to get a job in Greece, and the foreigner suggested he go straight to the Russian embassy there.

The upshot of it all, she recalled, was that Kampiles had somehow wound up with \$3,000.

"I questioned him about that," she said in skeptical tones. "He said he just gave information you could pick up anywhere—such as in Newsweek magazine. It was hard for me to believe."

At Kampiles' request, Thamakos said, she conveyed the account to a mutual friend, CIA officer George Joannides, but he, too, discounted it. Joannides "also thought it was very amusing," she recalled.

"Did Bill often fantasize about being involved in undercover work?" defense lawyer Monico asked at another point.

"Oh, he loved it," Thamakos replied. "That's all he talked about."

On the witness stand later, Kampiles acknowledged telling Thamakos of meeting a foreigner aboard the air plane to Athens, but he said he had just made that part up.

"Did you tell her the exact truth of what happened?" Monico asked him.

"No, I did not," Kampiles replied.

The government contends that the real truth is contained in Kampiles' admissions to FBI agents on Aug. 15 that he had given the Soviets the KHI manual after all FBI agents who spoke to him that day indicated

Kampiles justified the action in his own mind by reasoning that the document would not help the Soviet Union that much anyway, or, in Kampiles' reported words, would "not put them ahead by leaps and bounds."

The defense contends the confession was forced out of Kampiles by threats to implicate his family and is untrue. Yesterday's session ended in a prolonged bench conference.

THE WASHINGTON POST
17 November 1978

Article appeared
on page A-13

Jury Deliberates Charges In Kampiles Spy Trial

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

HAMMOND, Ind.—A somber-faced federal court jury began deliberating the espionage charges against former Central Intelligence Agency officer William Kampiles last night after he glumly acknowledged on the witness stand that he had confessed to the FBI.

The jurors recessed at 2 a.m. Eastern time and will convene again later this morning.

Kampiles, 23, insisted that his statements then were "false" and said he had tried to recant the very next day, but his lawyers found themselves boxed in when they tried to show why.

Continuing the extraordinary secrecy that attended the two-week trial, U.S. District Court Judge Phil M. McNaghy Jr. issued a sealed ruling yesterday morning that inhibited Kampiles' lawyers from asking the young defendant whether he had been intimidated.

The judge, it was understood, held that this line of questioning would open the door to an even more damaging counterattack by government prosecutors. Kampiles had been given a polygraph test two times before he made his confession last August and, according to reliable sources, he failed both times.

As a result, Kampiles, who had taken the witness stand in his own defense, was forced to admit, again and again, to telling FBI agents last Aug. 15 that he had indeed stolen a top-secret manual on the KH11-spy satellite from the CIA Operations Center last year and later sold it to the Russians for \$3,000 on a trip to Athens last February.

"That's what I said, yes," Kampiles testified repeatedly in the face of a relentless, point-by-point recitation by government prosecutor James Richmond.

Chief defense counsel Michael D. Monico, his voice choking with emotion, tried to repair the damage with an impassioned final argument, in which he urged the jurors to disregard the confession as "untrue, un-reliable and incredible."

He protested that the government was in such "a rush to prosecute this case" that no effort was made to find out whether anyone at the CIA Operations Center had seen the manual after Kampiles quit the agency in November 1977.

"Just because you get a kid to admitting to something he didn't do, that doesn't make a case," Monico protested. Nodding at Kampiles, the lawyer added, almost shouting:

"He wants to scream out his innocence. Don't convict him on statements that came out of his own mouth that day [Aug. 15]. He told them it wasn't true on the 16th. They paid no attention. He told them it wasn't true on the 17th. They paid no attention!"

"Please," Monico urged the jurors, "pay attention! End the nightmare."

U.S. attorney David T. Ready reminded the courtroom, however, that Kampiles had actually told "three stories about what went on in Greece" last winter.

The son of Greek immigrants, Kampiles tried the first version on a Washington friend of his, Anastasia Thamakos, on his return from the trip last March. Kampiles told her that he had met a foreigner on the flight to Athens in February and that he told the man he was looking for a job. According to this version, the foreigner suggested he go to the Russian embassy, which he did, meeting a Russian agent named "Michael" who paid him \$3,000 for promising to serve as a spy.

Thamakos said she didn't believe the story, but, at Kampiles' request, she passed it on to a mutual friend at the CIA, George Joannides, who didn't believe it either.

"He could have called George himself," Ready pointed out. "Why didn't he? Because he wanted to know whether that story would work and he found out. George didn't buy that story. He thought it was a fantasy. So when he met George in April, he had a new story."

According to this version, Ready reminded the jurors in sarcastic tones, Kampiles happened to be wandering past the Soviet embassy in Athens, around midnight in the middle of February, when he noticed an outdoor garden party in progress there.

By this account, Kampiles wandered in, met "Michael" and "conned" the Russian intelligence officer out of \$3,000 over a series of meetings by convincing "Michael" that he worked for the CIA and promising to come back with important information on a future trip to Greece.

Ready scoffed at the story. The Russians, he declared, "don't pay for a pig on the poke." FBI agents didn't believe Kampiles when he repeated the account to them on Aug. 14, Ready said, and they arranged another interrogation the next day with FBI agent James K. Murphy who confronted him with "inconsistencies" in the account.

It was then and only then, the prosecutor submitted, that Kampiles "told the truth."

FBI witnesses at the trial testified repeatedly that the Russians "never" pay hard cash simply on promises, but Monico contended otherwise. He introduced into the record a CIA study of Soviet operational techniques and gambits which indicated that the Russians will pay money simply to recruit someone.

"Soviet intelligence believes that Americans will do almost anything for money, and the factor of material incentive is somewhere present in every type of recruitment operation," the CIA study said. Quoting from a Soviet intelligence document, the study continued that the Russians advise their officers that "the successful use of financial motivation in recruitment requires an understanding of the psychological makeup of the average American. He seriously thinks of money as the only thing which can ensure his personal freedom and independence."

The defense, however, suffered another setback when it called a last-minute witness, another young CIA officer named Jacqueline Cooper, who also worked in the Operations Center when Kampiles did and for some months after he left. Interviewed by defense representatives over the telephone earlier this week, she had apparently given them the impression that she had seen the missing KH11 manual, the one Kampiles was accused of stealing, in December 1977 after he had left.

On the witness stand, however, she said she thought she might have actually seen a KH 11 "Handbook," a popularized version of the "Manual," which the Operations Center still had on hand.

While Monico sat back in frustration, government prosecutors used Cooper's unexpected appearance to ask her what kind of reputation Kampiles had for "truth and veracity" among his CIA co-workers.

"It's not very good," she testified.

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Court Session Reportedly Told Chilean Official Is CIA Agent

By Ronald J. Ostrow
Los Angeles Times

A secret court session has been told of "information" that Hernan Cubillos, Chile's foreign minister, has been a "principal" Central Intelligence Agency operative, the Los Angeles Times learned yesterday.

Patrick M. Wall, defense lawyer for Robert Berrellez, an International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. official, cited the information in a closed court hearing Oct. 23, informed sources said.

Wall considered the subject so sensitive that he turned over his copy of the sealed court record to John T. Kotelly, a Justice Department prosecutor, saying he did not want disclosure blamed on him.

Berrellez has been charged with conspiracy, perjury and obstructing governmental proceedings as a result of testimony he gave in 1973 to a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee investigating ITT-CIA attempts to block the 1970 election of Salvador Allende as president of Chile.

Sources said Wall told the court he had "seen" information on Cubillos' covert role, but did not have physical access to it. The lawyer was seeking government documents to bolster Berrellez' defense that he is being prosecuted for acts he contends he was induced to do by CIA representatives, including Cubillos.

Wall's New York office said yesterday that he was traveling and could not be reached for comment.

Juan Prado, press officer for the Chilean Embassy in Washington, said the information sounded "impossible" to him. "It's the first time in my life I have heard something about Mr.

Cubillos and the CIA. For sure, I can say it's a lie."

A CIA spokesman would not comment on grounds the case is still pending.

U.S. District Court Judge Aubrey Robinson Jr. dismissed the jury in the Berrellez case last month rather than accept the Justice Department's special procedure for protecting sensitive information in the case.

The Justice Department urged the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia last Thursday to direct Robinson to accept the procedures under which prosecutors could challenge the relevancy of defense material before it is presented in open court.

Assistant Attorney General Philip B. Heymann had indicated to reporters that the government's chief concern in the case was over revealing CIA station locations. But, without confirming Cubillos' CIA tie, he said yesterday that his earlier statement was merely "illustrative" of the problems surrounding the case.

"With regard to any people or any places, I just can't tell you anything," Heymann said.

Cubillos had been mentioned in the criminal information that the Justice Department filed against Berrellez, but prosecutors dropped references to him without explanation on the day the trial was to begin.

Cubillos, 42, was named foreign minister last April 20, although his only previous government service had been as a Chilean naval officer.

Before dismissing the Berrellez jury, Judge Robinson said of the government's secrecy proposals: "I just sense there is one name that if it pops up could blow... I don't know what."

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12 November 1978

Letelier Probe Figure Linked to 2 Murder Plots

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

A former Chilean secret police chief has been linked by the chief witness in the Letelier case with assassination plots against exiled Chilean Gen. Carlos Prats in Argentina and Christian Democratic politician Bernardo Leighton in Rome.

The witness, Michael V. Townley, said Gen. Manuel Contreras Sepulveda was involved in the other plots. Townley, one of Contreras' most-trusted agents in DINA, the secret police, has pleaded guilty to his part in the bomb-murder here of Orlando Letelier, a Chilean leftist exile, and Letelier's American colleague Ronni Karpen Moffitt.

Sources close to the Letelier case in Santiago, Chile, have confirmed that Townley also has acknowledged that he played a key role in the Prats and Leighton attacks on direct orders from Contreras.

The fatal bombing of Prats and his wife in their car in Buenos Aires on Sept. 30, 1974, and the gunshot wounding of Leighton and his wife in Rome on Oct. 6, 1975, are not mentioned in the 600 pages of evidence that the United States has sent to the Chilean Supreme Court in an effort to obtain extradition of Contreras and two other DINA officers, Col. Pedro Espinoza and Capt. Armando Fernandez, reliable sources say.

THE INFORMATION was not given to Chile because the United States has no authority to prosecute Contreras in assassination cases that occurred in other countries.

The only officials in Washington who know what the package contains are Assistant U.S. Attorneys Eugene M. Propper and E. Lawrence Barcella and FBI agents Carter Cornick and Robert Scherrer.

These officials will not comment on the evidence against Contreras and his DINA aides, but it is known that the case has been built largely on information provided by Townley.

Information reaching here from sources in Chile indicates that Townley has said that the murder of the Prats and the attack on the Leightons were carried out on orders from Contreras.

Now under arrest in Chile, Contreras has denied that he ordered the American-born Townley to come to Washington in September 1976 to kill Letelier.

INFORMED SOURCES have stopped short of saying that Townley was the "hit man" against Prats and Leighton, but it is reliably reported that Townley made trips to Argentina and Europe using a passport in the name of Kenneth Enyard, a pseudonym he is known to have used while living in Florida.

The political implications are explosive if Contreras did order the assassination of another Chilean general. While the Chilean officer corps may stick together on the Letelier murder, even if most of them were disgusted with the act, there is bound to be a divisive effect if it is proven that one Chilean general ordered the bomb-murder of another.

A month before Prats and his wife were killed when a bomb went off under their car, the exiled general wrote President Augusto Pinochet Ugarte and denounced Pinochet as "a traitor without parallel in the nation's history." Prats compared Pinochet with the late Haitian dictator, Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier.

THERE HAS BEEN no accusation by the United States in its extradition documents that Pinochet was the moving force behind acts ordered by Contreras. The two men were close friends and had breakfast together almost daily until the Letelier murder.

Contreras and hard-line, right-wing officers in the Chilean military government are known to believe Pinochet made a disastrous mistake in handing Townley over to the United States.

Once in the United States, Townley talked freely about how he placed the bomb under Letelier's car and how he recruited a group of Cuban exiles to help him carry out the assassination.

Cornick, one of the FBI agents, has testified in court that Townley left Washington once the bomb was placed and that it was triggered by remote control by an anti-Castro Cuban activist, Jose Dionisio Suarez.

The extradition documents were used by Chilean Supreme Court Justice Israel Borquez to question Contreras and the two other DINA officers in secret sessions in Santiago. The contents were not released even though one copy is in the hands of the Chilean lawyer representing the United States, Alfredo Etcheberry. U.S. District Judge Barrington D. Parker has ordered Propper to give him a copy of the extradition documents by tomorrow.

TOWNLEY'S KNOWLEDGE of orders issued by Contreras in the Letelier case are expected to become known in the course of the trial here of three of the five Cubans in the plot: Guillermo and Ignacio Novo and Alvin Ross Diaz. The trial is scheduled to begin Jan. 3. The other two Cubans, Suarez and Virgilio Paz, are fugitives sought by the FBI and Latin American police departments.

But it is probable, legal sources say, that Townley will not be permitted to answer questions about cases over which the United States has no jurisdiction when he takes the stand as Propper's most important witness.

Contreras, meanwhile, is accusing the CIA and U.S. Ambassador to Chile George Landau with being involved in Letelier's death. He has told Chilean journalists that Townley was "an agent, but not DINA's."

Contreras said, however, that Townley entered the United States with U.S. visas obtained in Paraguay "thanks to some good Paraguayan friends and especially to the good, decisive action of our then-ally, Ambassador Landau."

U.S. officials have categorically stated that the visas first issued in Asuncion to Townley and Fernandez were taken away from them because Landau and the State Department were suspicious of two non-Paraguayans seeking the U.S. visas with the endorsement of a Paraguayan official. It was this application that provided Propper and the FBI with the photos that later led to the identification of two DINA agents.

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Perspective

Spying on ITT's shadowy Chilean connection

By EDWARD M. KERRY

Halloween was the apt occasion for a brief glimpse of the country's most unsettling ghost—the specter of a scandal more extensive, more pervasive, more significant and more haunting than any other in our modern history. Even Watergate? Yes, even that indelible shame. For five presidents head the Who's Who of those enmeshed in the web of concealed crimes, cloaked relationships and covert actions which made Watergate, Vietnam and more recent, if lesser, disasters as inevitable as night follows day.

For the past 18 months, Jimmy Carter, as the four presidents before him, has been wrestling with these skeletons, trying to push them back into the closets of secret "history." But they won't be silent. They rattle in one or another federal courtroom, agency grand jury, and in the minds of a few reporters and editors willing to challenge the party line set by the White House and echoed by the media barons in New York and Washington.

The few bones the public has been allowed to see so far—and then only through lenses which distort, filter or bedazzle honest vision—are labeled "the ITT affair." Full exposure, though, of that conglomerate's links to the last five presidents (and perhaps even farther back) would slice open a cross-section of the very core of the nation's power structure.

The public could then see how the rings of past duplicities bind together in current complicities the best-known Democrats and

Republicans and how they, in turn, are linked through the CIA (and by money) to the major banks, corporations, unions, foundations and even newspapers and TV networks. The citizenry could then grasp some of the root causes of why deceit is now such an ingrained means of communication between elected and electors, why blackmail or "gray-mail" is such a common form of contact between some of our most successful men, and why the more power is centralized and amplified in Washington, the more we have abuse of it by those who control its levers.

Such assertions will, quite understandably, strike many Americans as overblown even for this "age of triumphant mendacity." However, the summary provided herein is documented, detail by detail, in the archives of the CIA, the White House, the Justice and State Departments; each key element has been sworn to under the federal laws governing perjury and/or defamation; each has gone unchallenged in any court in the two years since I stated the basic facts in evidence to the Justice Department and in testimony still held SECRET by the Senate Oversight Committee; much has been checked and rechecked by reporter Joe Trento and the editors of this newspaper.

So slickly did Attorney General Griffin Bell seem to be directing his latest attempt to bury the elusive "ITT" ghost that the Halloween interment a fortnight ago drew few mourners and even fewer protesters. Only a handful of TV news shows carried the news that the government would drop its charges of perjury and of

conspiracy against two ITT executives, Robert Berrellez and Edward J. Gerrity, rather than reveal the bulging secrets behind their case. A federal grand jury had handed down indictments of the two for having lied under oath in 1973-75 when they denied ITT had passed hundreds of thousands of dollars in an attempt to prevent Salvador Allende from being inaugurated as president of Chile in 1970.

The Justice Department's cases are very strong. CIA agents in our embassy in Chile when I was there, have confessed to when, how, why and to whom the funds were passed with their help. At least one even admitted to plotting with ITT to tell lies in 1973 to the Senate committee investigating the giant conglomerate. The defense, however, demands the right to see and to introduce as evidence CIA and other government documents. This ploy worked last year for the top men of ITT and CIA. So why shouldn't it be equally valid for such (comparative) small fry as Berrellez and Gerrity, their attorneys ask.

It was just one year ago that the Carter-Bell team let the big fish off the hook. They decided that Richard Helms, former CIA director, and Harold Geneen, the highest paid executive at just under one million dollars a year as ITT's chairman, should not be booked on criminal charges. And behind and above them was a roster of implicated men who are household names. Not only were none charged but the president,

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the vice president, and the attorney general pulled strings to protect them.

"National security" was, once again, the excuse for Justice's demand that the latest case be tried by sticking only to what little it would permit the accused and the public to know. Bell invoked the same intimidating pretext last All Hollow's Day. Then he treated the nation to the trick of sneaking Helms into a federal district court to receive a suspended sentence for a misdemeanor.

At the very moment Bell was trying to corral the ghosts which threaten his president and his party, another government agency seemed to be doing just the reverse. The Securities and Exchange Commission won a legal battle to release hush-hush documents about ITT in Chile and elsewhere. It disclosed ITT had paid about \$9 million in bribes to politicians and officials in nine countries. The SEC, as the protector of stockholders, said it would fine ITT \$100,000 a day until the corporation released the documents incriminating the bribe-takers. It also asked ITT to replace its entire board of directors.

For ITT, the SEC ultimatum poses a Hobson's choice. The corporation has spent many millions in legal fees the past six years and its executives have paid a fortune in contributions to Democrats, Republicans and foreign politicians to keep these details concealed. Acceptance of the SEC's terms would be admissions of guilt in a form which could trigger very costly backlashes: financial losses not only in the nine countries but in dozens of other lands where ITT has investments susceptible to political retribution; class action suits for billions in damages by ITT shareholders; prosecution for fraud of Harold Geneen, the management genius behind ITT's spectacular growth during the past two decades and the man who aligned ITT with presidents and spy-masters in CIA plots in many places.

As the one who first went to the Justice Department in early 1976 to force a criminal inquiry into the actions by Geneen and his corporate and government partners in crime, I can detail why partisan politics, personal ambition and even fear of penal punishment — not "national security" — are behind the legal roadblocks erected by the two political parties for so long to save Geneen and ITT from trial and harsh punishment.

George Orwell, the author of "1984," who foresaw how perilously close at times democrats come to act like (Soviet) commissars, said it best 30 years ago:

"Political language — and, with variations, this is true of all political parties from conservatives to anarchists — is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind."

If "national security" was truly at stake, as Bell insists, what disclosure could top the secret Richard Helms finally let out of the bag only a few weeks ago when he testified to the House Committee inquiring into the assassination of President John F. Kennedy? Helms swore that the plots to kill Castro (and presumably others) were known at the time to the president himself, to Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, to Vice President Johnson, to Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara (now head of the World Bank), to National Security Adviser MacGeorge Bundy (now head of the Ford Foundation), and to "all kinds of people" since it was a "government-wide" operation. Such cold-bloodedness in romantic Camelot contradicts the whitewash of the Kennedys by the Senate committee which investigated the CIA in 1975.

The two key Democrats on that committee, Frank Church and Walter Mondale, were not unaware of the role played by the Kennedys and their friends. The two senators brushed aside frantic pleas from the CIA, the State Department, Henry Kissinger and President Ford to keep secret the inner workings of our intelligence agency. The two dismissed "national security" as a Republican attempt to cover up plots carried out — as Frank Church phrased it — by a rogue elephant called the CIA. The public's right to know, they said then, transcended the CIA's institutional interests.

The senators, however, concealed scores of White House actions, starting with the Kennedys' participation in the strategic plotting of murder, which have continuing impact on the nation's political life and the country's morality.

ITT, for example, and other corporations, were recruited in the 1960s for CIA operations at the behest of the Kennedys. President Kennedy decided in 1963 that he needed Big Business to make his policies work in South and Central America. He asked David Rockefeller to organize the major companies and banks into one, more manageable, grouping. In return, Rockefeller requested — and Kennedy agreed — the government would act to guarantee 100 percent fresh investments in Latin America by U.S. corporations against such political risks as nationalization.

Robert Kennedy, meanwhile, had been overseeing the enlistment of individual company and union officials into CIA covert programs.

Attorney General Kennedy was the driving force in those days in Washington behind the new concept of "civic action" by the armies and police of Third World countries facing Communist-led insurgencies; and he was also the official who pushed the rapid world wide expansion of CIA personnel and operations. He believed that the same will to win and the organizational genius which had carried the first Catholic into the White House could be applied to stem the tide of Castroism in South America.

These elements led the Kennedys in 1962-63 to plunge the United States up to its eyeballs in the Political lives of, among others, Colombia, Vietnam and Chile. All three were overwhelmingly Catholic and beset by problems, although Chile did not face the guerrilla insurgencies of the other two.

Even before John F. Kennedy won the presidency, the most influential Jesuits and bishops had come to his office in the Senate from Chile to rouse interest in that distant democracy. Later, in the White House, the President, the attorney general and others in the official family met regularly with the brilliant Belgian Jesuit, Roger Vekemans, who the Vatican had dispatched to Chile in 1958 with instructions to revive the impoverished, embattled Church.

It was Vekemans (in Santiago), who first articulated the principles, values and directions that later were to jell into the Alliance for Progress. It was he, with the reinforcing influence of promi-

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nent American (and European) clerics, who persuaded the Kennedys to channel via A.I.D. and CIA tens of millions of dollars to Chile for political purpose. By letter and by mouth, the president was told that three enemies had to be stopped: "Laicism, Protestantism and Marxism." These three forces, Vekemans and his friends argued, were vitiating the Church and ripening Chile for a Communist takeover. That threat was personified, they told the White House, by Salvador Allende.

The Kennedys agreed. They gave the order for mobilization of all the resources of mind and of pocketbook needed to build a modern, progressive Catholic party out of the Christian Democrats, then laggards in Chile's political lineup. The president gave the instructions to go all-out for the election of Eduardo Frei, leader of the Christian Democrats, and for the defeat of Allende, after a secret Oval Office meeting with Senator Frei in early 1963.

By sending large amount of public funds to combat "Laicism" and "Protestantism," the Kennedys sowed the wind. Not only did they violate, casually and thoughtlessly, the constitutional prohibition against such use of public monies, but they also assured the election of Allende the next time round in 1970. For if "Protestantism" referred to the hundreds of American missionaries seeking converts among the poor, then "Laicism" meant the largest political party in the land, the Radical Party. The one unifying idea that knitted and motivated the strongly democratic, yet disparate members of that party — particularly its large numbers of public school teachers — was its anti-clerical bias; its fundamental and vibrant adherence to Free Masonry. And Allende, like his one-time good friend, lodge brother and supporter, General Pinochet, was a devoted Free Mason.

The Kennedys roused an enduring enmity for their country by large numbers of Radicals. They saw the U.S. effort to build a dike against Castroism as support of Jesuitical plans, praiseworthy though they might be to many non-Catholic Americans and Chileans. They knew that the U.S. government had bribed and bullied the major corporations into contributing to Frei's campaign and into cutting off the Radical candidate by holding out the promises of large U.S. government loans and of investment guarantees, as well as other favors at home. They were aware, too, that the Rockefeller-led group had, in tandem with the CIA, used its tremendous influence to nudge Chilean industrialists and conservatives into supporting the progressive Frei.

The Radicals were severely weakened by the 1964 election which Frei won by a large margin (56 percent to 39 percent) over Allende. And soon, financial injury was added to the political insult they felt dealt by Washington in favor of Frei: the clergy and the Church.

The presidential assistant in the White House responsible for Latin America in general, and the back-Frei Strategy in Chile in particular, was Ralph Dungan. In the early 1960s, just as in recent years, Dungan was the behind-the-scenes manager of what the U.S. did in Chile and what the Church, the labor unions and the Democratic Party here said — or did not say — about Chile. In 1964, as again in 1977, a grateful party rewarded him with an ambassadorial post.

President Johnson named him to Chile one month after the victory of Frei which JFK did not live to rejoice. In the next two years, Dungan pried loose for Chile more U.S. economic aid per capita than to any other country at peace; and he arranged for the American taxpayer to underwrite more insurance of American corporate investment — close to one billion dollars worth, or one-fourth the worldwide total of such underwriting, against the very high risk of nationalization. (All told, he had the U.S. taxpayer holding almost two billion dollars of IOUs in Chile.)

Dungan leaned hard on the Radicals as part of his promise to the Kennedys to convert the Frei experiment in progressive Catholicism into a model for all Latin America. He persuaded American copper companies to end lucrative supply contracts (a not unusual means for corporations to buy influence) with Chilean companies owned or controlled by Radical politicians; he demanded that the Anaconda Copper Co. hire Christian Democrats and fire Marxists and Radicals. One Radical, Senator Hugo Miranda, revenged his loss of a contract with Anaconda by becoming the leader of the elect-Allende faction of his party in 1967; he provided 4 to 5 percent of the 36 percent total vote Allende attracted in 1970 in his narrow one percent margin of victory and led the Radicals into Allende's government.

Despite the barrels of money, despite the CIA, despite the fine Frei reforms and despite the non-stop political action against the Marxists, the Radicals and the Conservatives, the U.S. failed. Dungan decided to leave Chile immediately after Frei's party fell far, far short of the victory the ambassador had predicted in the nationwide municipal elections in 1967. By the time I arrived towards the end of that year, the recurrent bugaboo of Chile, very high inflation and high unemployment — what came to the U.S. later as stagflation — were once again stalking the land.

Richard Nixon also turned sour on Frei. No sooner did he move into the White House in 1969 than he crossed off the Chilean President from the list of state visitors scheduled that year. Soon after, he decreed Chile should have no further U.S. economic aid — a decision taken 18 months before the election of the Marxist Allende.

Nixon's dislike of the Kennedys steered him into the same blind alleys that led to Watergate. For him, Frei was a creature of the Kennedys; for him, the Christian Democratic program of ever-bigger government bureaucracy, of transaction with the local Communists, of ever larger welfare programs and social reforms, of ever-rising taxation, and of more and more government encroachment on business and agriculture, was what the Kennedys had in mind for the United States.

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Nixon needed close friends such as Don Kendall, head of PepsiCo and a former Nixon client who, in turn, repeated the views of his good friend, Augustin Edwards, the richest man in Chile, owner of its most powerful newspapers and the leader of the Chilean Big Business counterpart of the group David Rockefeller had created for John F. Kennedy. Edwards had been a major conduit for the political action cash poured via the CIA by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations into the beat-Allende campaign of 1963-64; he had been one of the most frequent visitors to Ambassador Dungan's residence; his entree to the CIA, and to official Washington, was at the highest levels. So, it is not surprising that Nixon brushed aside my cabled protests that his anti-Frei actions would boomerang into help for the Marxists in the 1970 election, and to push a friendly Chilean government into policies (e.g. ties to Cuba) opposed by Washington. Instead, Nixon listened to the CIA, Kendall, Edwards and their friends. They said his slaps at Frei would serve to elect a conservative president in September of 1970.

Five months before the elections, the same formidable alliance, of Edwards and the CIA, of conservatives there and here, coordinated plans to overturn another of my recommendations: that the U.S. not support Conservative candidate Alessandri in his race with the Marxist Allende and the Christian Democrat Tomic. (Frei was constitutionally barred from a second term.)

The CIA Station Chief, Henry Hecksher, a devoted friend of Edwards, had carped at me daily for two years in an effort to convert me and thereby, the U.S. into a fan of the Conservative. I had refused on the grounds that if Chile was two-thirds anti-Communist, it was also two-thirds anti-Rightist. It would be grotesque for us to try once again, at a very high cost of taxpayer funds, I said, to manage the Chilean economy and policy.

The CIA chief's fall-back argument did hit home, though. If the U.S. acted as if it did not care what happened to Chile, he said, it would not only be a betrayal of the dreams and of the billions expended by the Kennedy and the Johnson Administrations, but the indifference would be read by the Chilean citizen as a subliminal invitation to vote for Allende, the ally of Castro. I was as strongly convinced as the three presidents I served that the forces Allende represented would seek, over time and by clever exploitation of the loopholes in democratic laws, to replace what American understood to be democracy with something akin to the Castro or Eastern European systems. I had no doubts his policies would be unremittably anti-U.S. Indeed, Vice President Hubert Humphrey (Mondale's sponsor and idol) had written me to say just that; Humphrey had been instrumental as a Senator in funnelling A.I.D. money to Chile for political action in support of Father Vekeman's plans.

As a compromise, I recommended in early 1970 that we increase anti-Communist propaganda in Chile to \$500,000 — a derisory amount when compared to the 1963-64 effort; about \$400,000 was actually spent.

That modest policy brought the Council of Americas running to Washington. In a secret session at State, Council President Jose de Cubas and Council member Jay Parkinson, the Chairman of Anaconda, argued that government and business should operate in tandem, as in 1963-64, to elect Chile's president. This time they wanted the joint push behind Conservative Alessandri; they offered to spend at least \$500,000 if the government would also commit itself.

Informed of this end-run, I sent

a cable of blistering criticism. Although my message was regarded by the White House as being so sensitive that it ordered all copies returned from other government offices to the Secretary of State's office, the Council was quickly briefed. Harold Geneen took up the cudgels. ITT's boss sat on the nine-man executive committee of that group with Rockefeller, PepsiCo's Kendall and de Cubas. Geneen's men swarmed through Washington the spring and summer of 1970, lobbying the CIA, the Pentagon, the White House, State and Congress.

The effort failed only because the CIA's polls predicted over and over that Allende would be crushed by its favorite, Alessandri. The intelligence agency was far off the mark; Allende won by a hair, by only 1 percent, with only one-third of the electorate, but he was first.

Edwards fled to the United States after a last-minute meeting he requested via the CIA with me. In reply to his one question, I told him that the U.S. would not, under any circumstances, directly or indirectly, get involved in any military plot. Upon arrival in New York, Edwards met with Kendall. The PepsiCo chief telephoned the President. Nixon called Kissinger and Attorney General John Mitchell. Meet Edwards and Kendall, he told them.

The morning after the four breakfasted, Kissinger briefed the president. Within hours, Nixon instructed Helms to do "everything necessary" to keep Allende from being inaugurated. Helms told the president that it was not "impossible," as I had been maintaining, for a military plot to succeed; Nixon ordered Helms to hide whatever the CIA did from "the weak sisters" at State and from me.

CIA headquarters chose General Viaux (a man I had placed totally off-limits to all U.S. representatives one year earlier) as the man to stop Allende's accession. Through the Edwards companies and with the funds of ITT, it added side bets on politicians, admirals, generals and others. When I discovered the CIA was working, contrary to my explicit instructions, with an extreme

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rightist group, Patria y Libertad, I sent a frantic cable, my second such warning, to Nixon and Kissinger that if they were contemplating any military plot, the boomerang would be "worse than the Bay of Pigs."

Kissinger promptly ordered me home. Upon return, I told him Allende was certain to be confirmed as president by the Chilean Congress and that any plot would backfire. He led me immediately to Nixon. The president told us how he was going to "smash" an Allende government by economic pressure. I told Nixon he was "dead wrong." Hostility would be self-fulfilling. I argued. Instead, I urged him first to negotiate fairly and promptly with the Chilean Marxist; I pleaded for him to send a cable of congratulations and a normal delegation to Allende's inauguration.

That week, as a result, State had me write its "soft-line" recommendations to Nixon. The President and Kissinger, I discovered years later, promptly pulled the CIA back from Vaux. They ordered the CIA to seek other "assets." While the CIA was implementing the new instructions, the Vaux plot backfired into the murder of the commander-in-chief of the Chilean armed forces, General Schneider.

Months later, the New York Times' C. L. Sulzberger whispered into my ear in Santiago that "unimpeachable sources" had informed him I was responsible for preventing the U.S. "from becoming involved militarily in Chile." Since Sulzberger had come to Chile directly from lengthy Washington interviews with Nixon, Kissinger and Helms, and since it was well-known they entrusted him with secrets, his statement confirmed my unshakeable belief that I had, in fact, dissuaded the White House and stymied the CIA — by a score of preventative actions — from any rash action.

Next Sunday in Perspective, Korry writes about how he saw the story of U.S. involvement in Chile covered up by several administrations, congressional committees and major newspapers.

The envoy who talks

Edward Malcolm Korry was recruited into government service in 1962 as President Kennedy's ambassador to Ethiopia.

At the time he was assistant to the president of Cowles Magazines and Broadcasting, for whom he had also been Look Magazine's European editor. Before that he was an award-winning foreign correspondent for United Press.

After a career in newspaper and magazine journalism, Edward Malcolm Korry was recruited into government service in 1962 as President Kennedy's ambassador to Ethiopia.

In 1967 President Johnson assigned him to Chile. He was in Santiago when the Nixon administration, the Central Intelligence Agency and International Telephone and Telegraph tried to prevent the election and rule of a Marxist president, Salvador Allende Gossens.

Nixon fired Korry in 1971 after the ambassador refused to go along with the plotting Korry tried unsuccessfully for years to ring out the full story until in 1976 he got a willing ear from then Attorney General Edward Levi. Some of Korry's charges were confirmed most recently by a Securities and Exchange Commission action charging ITT with numerous corrupt practices in its overseas dealings. Korry was a key witness in that case.

The Sunday News Journal was the first news organization to print and confirm the complicated story Korry had been trying to make public since 1974.

In trying to make his story public and to gain a full investigation, Korry has been both hailed as a hero and labeled as unreliable and as a malcontent.

In two successive articles, in today's and next week's Sunday News Journal, Korry offers from his perspective the story of involvement and cover-up.

Article appeared
on page A-13

THE WASHINGTON POST
10 November 1978

New Ruling Sought To Protect Secrets At ITT Aide's Trial

By Charles R. Babcock
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Justice Department, as expected, asked the federal Court of Appeals in Washington yesterday to approve special procedures to protect national secrets from disclosure at the trial of an International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. official.

Philip B. Heymann, chief of the criminal division, said in the department's brief that U.S. District Court Judge Aubrey Robinson Jr. erred in saying he didn't have authority to set up such rules.

Robinson dismissed the jury in the perjury and conspiracy trial of ITT executive Robert Berrellez two weeks ago after refusing the prosecutors' request to be able to challenge the relevancy of defense evidence before—rather than after—it is presented in open court.

Berrellez is charged with lying and conspiring with Central Intelligence Agency officers to obstruct a 1973 Senate investigation of efforts by the CIA and ITT to block the 1970 election of Salvador Allende as president of Chile.

Robinson said in dismissing the jury that the Justice Department request was "unprecedented." The government brief noted, however, that a similar set of rules was set up for the current trial of former CIA officer William Kampiles in Hammond, Ind. Kampiles is charged with selling supersecret information on a U.S. satellite to Soviet agents.

In its legal brief in the Berrellez case, the Justice Department said it was seeking advance warning on any defense evidence bearing on the locations of CIA officers or their stations, the relations between the CIA and any Chilean and the identity of any CIA source other than ITT officials.

Heymann said the government is "gravely concerned" that such information might be brought out at the trial, even inadvertently.

Specifically, the government asked the appeals court to direct Robinson to sign a so-called protective order setting up the procedures giving prosecutors a chance to challenge the relevancy of defense evidence.

The Justice Department brief argued that the appeals court should hear the arguments because the issues are a continuing problem in prosecuting sensitive national security cases.

"Unless set aside, the District Court's ruling will in all likelihood prompt the government to dismiss the charges rather than risk the compromise of extremely sensitive national security information," the government said.

Attorney General Griffin B. Bell referred to the problem in a Wednesday press conference, saying he may seek legislation to make it easier to use such special procedures.

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WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
14 NOVEMBER 1978

Snepp Appeal Tests U.S. Power to Halt Books

By Robert Pear

Washington Star Staff Writer

Frank W. Snepp III, a former CIA agent, goes to the U.S. Court of Appeals in Richmond tomorrow in an effort to overturn a lower-court ruling that he betrayed his ex-employer by writing an unauthorized account of the fall of South Vietnam.

A three-judge panel must decide the basic question: whether Snepp's book "Decent Interval" is protected under the First Amendment, as Snepp contends, or whether its publication represents a simple breach of contract, as the government insists.

"This is not a First Amendment case," Judge Oren R. Lewis said emphatically during the trial in U.S. District Court in Alexandria in June.

Lewis ruled that in not submitting his manuscript to the CIA for pre-publication review, Snepp had "willfully, deliberately and surreptitiously" broken his CIA contract and violated a "fiduciary duty" he owed his employer, the government.

ALL CIA EMPLOYEES, on joining the agency, sign an agreement not to disclose information without first obtaining the agency's permission.

Lewis ordered Snepp to forfeit the \$60,000 he had gained from the book, as well as any future royalties.

Lewis' ruling came as no surprise. Less than a half-hour after the trial began, he was telling Snepp's lawyers how to get to the appeals court in Richmond — "I-95, go south."

Snepp and his principal attorney, Mark H. Lynch of the American Civil Liberties Union, as well as Justice Department and CIA lawyers, will follow those directions tomorrow as they go to court to argue the appeal, with half an hour allotted to each side.

Snepp wants the case against him dismissed. Failing that goal, he wants the case sent back to District Court for a jury trial. Lewis denied Snepp's original request for a jury trial, saying there were no issues of

fact that could be handed over to a jury.

Describing the importance of the Snepp case, Attorney General Griffin Bell has said that civil suits for breach of contract might be the only realistic way for the government to protect legitimate secrets. The problem with criminal prosecutions, he said, is that the government must make the secret public in court to prosecute.

THE IDENTITIES of the three judges hearing Snepp's appeal will not be known until tomorrow.

But the main arguments can be gleaned from 225 pages of briefs filed with the appellate court during the past three weeks.

Snepp's case is founded on the assertion that his book does not contain any classified or secret information. Indeed, he notes, the government did not accuse him of revealing classified information.

In that respect, Snepp's brief says, his case differs from that of Victor L. Marchetti, another former CIA agent, who "violated his agreement by revealing classified matters and . . . intended to make further such disclosures."

The government contends that the CIA alone, not an individual employee, has the authority and expertise to determine whether information is classified.

Snepp may think he knows whether his book contains classified information. But he is not "in a position to know officially," according to the Justice Department brief, which says that Snepp "arrogated to himself the responsibility vested in the agency to determine, prior to publication, whether the book" contained classified information.

TOWARD THE END of his book, subtitled "An Insider's Account of Saigon's Indecent End, Told By the CIA's Chief Strategy Analyst in Vietnam," Snepp alludes to the agency's pre-publication review process.

He says he decided "not to submit my manuscript to the agency for clearance and censorship, as all former employees-turned-author are required to do."

His rationale was that "if the CIA could officially leak to the press to whitewash its role in Vietnam, it had forfeited the right to censor me in the name of security or national interest."

Following is a summary of the major issues presented to the Court of Appeals in the legal briefs:

- Snepp acknowledges that the agreement he signed on joining the CIA in 1968 required him to submit all manuscript materials for review by the agency. But he says this document was superseded by the 1976 agreement he signed on leaving the CIA. The latter, he says, required advance clearance only for classified information.

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But Snepp's brief says, "The argument that publication of non-secrets will arouse fears that secrets might be disclosed is, on its face, simply too attenuated and speculative. . . ."

- Snepp's lawyers also say that the penalty imposed on him, requiring forfeiture of all profits derived from the book, was "draconian . . . exorbitant and unwarranted."

- They say that a District Court order requiring Snepp to submit manuscripts for CIA review is so "overbroad" that it covers a fictional short story about a romantic affair between a CIA officer and a French woman in Saigon.

The government maintains, however, that the injunction and other penalties were proper.

- Snepp's brief asserts that he was a victim of selective "discriminatory enforcement" because scores of other government employees with access to classified information have published books about their experiences with impunity. Snepp says he was singled out because the contents of his book were critical of and embarrassing to the CIA.

- The government says Judge Lewis correctly concluded that this argument had no merit and did not apply to a civil contract case, especially because Snepp failed to show that publications critical of the CIA were treated differently from others.

- Snepp emphasizes the "textual inconsistency" between the two agreements, saying that "regulations in the First Amendment area must be drawn with pinpoint precision."

- The government, which sees no inconsistency between the two agreements, says Snepp's interpretation is a "tortured reading" of the contracts.

- In any case, Snepp says, the 1968 secrecy agreement is "unenforceable" because no government agency can impose prior restraints on the publication of public, unclassified information — except perhaps with explicit authorization from Congress or the president.

- The government says the director of central intelligence is under a statutory obligation to protect "intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." To perform that duty, he contends, he must have the right to review all manuscript materials based on CIA employment so he can weed out classified data and genuine secrets.

- Judge Lewis said that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript for CIA review caused the United States "irreparable harm and loss" and "impaired CIA's ability to gather and protect intelligence."

But Snepp says the government failed to show "any actual injury."

- CIA Director Stansfield Turner and former CIA Director William Colby testified that intelligence sources, including foreign nations, might lose confidence in the CIA's ability to keep secrets.

Article appeared
on page A-16

THE WASHINGTON POST
16 November 1978

Snepp Appeals Ruling on Book About Vietnam

By Paul G. Edwards
Washington Post Staff Writer

RICHMOND—The 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals wrestled yesterday with the question of how former Central Intelligence Agency officer Frank W. Snepp had harmed the government by writing a book that contains no secrets and came up with contradictory answers.

U.S. District Court Judge Owen R. Lewis decided last summer that Snepp violated his contract with the CIA by publishing "Decent Interval" without agency approval of the manuscript. Lewis ordered him to give the government his profits from the book—\$80,000 at the time of the order—and told him not to write anything else about the CIA without submitting it to the agency first.

As the appeal of the Lewis decision was being argued before a three-judge appeals court panel yesterday, Judge J. Dickson Phillips clearly was troubled by the government's admission that Snepp's book about the fall of Saigon in the Vietnam war contains no classified information.

"With the government conceding that there has been no divulging of classified information... what is it we are trying to get at here?" Phillips asked.

Justice Department lawyer Robert E. Kopp argued in his answers to Phillips that "it is irrelevant that no classified information is in the book."

Kopp said Snepp should be penalized for failing to submit his manuscript to the CIA, even though no secrets were compromised. He said Snepp should be treated as an investment trustee who has deliberately mishandled funds committed to his care in a way that subjected an investor to undue risks. In such a case, he said, it is irrelevant whether the investor suffers any actual loss.

Snepp's lawyer, American Civil Liberties Union attorney Mark H. Lynch, urged the court to reject Kopp's theory of harmful risk to the government.

"This is not a securities case," he said in rebuttal. "This case involves information about the workings of the government. It goes to the core of the free flow of information that is protected by the First Amendment. You don't award damages for activities protected by the First Amendment without a finding of harm or malice."

Judge Lewis took the unequivocal position during the Snepp trial that "this is not a First Amendment case." He ruled that Snepp's failure to submit his book for approval caused the CIA "irreparable harm and loss." He said the unauthorized publication "impaired CIA's ability to gather and protect intelligence."

CIA Director Stansfield Turner and former director William E. Colby testified at the trial that the unauthorized publication might cause intelligence sources, including foreign governments, to distrust the agency's ability to keep confidences. In their appeal briefs, Snepp's lawyers label this conclusion "speculative."

Lewis's peremptory manner of handling the Snepp case caused controversy at the time of the trial and formed the basis for part of Snepp's appeal. Lynch argued briefly that Lewis should have submitted some of the issues to a jury, including the question of whether there were discrepancies in two secrecy agreements signed by Snepp while he was with the CIA.

The first agreement explicitly required agency approval of books written by agents and the second was silent on the subject. Lynch argued that the second agreement superseded the first, but Lewis ruled it did not and that Snepp was still bound by his 1965 agreement to submit manuscripts for approval.

Judge Harrison L. Winter questioned attorneys at length on the question of which secrecy contract, if not both, applies to Snepp and commented at one point "it's almost impossible to resolve."

Article appeared
on page A-13

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
16 November 1978

Ex-Agent's Freedom of Speech

Snepp Lawyer Argues '1st Amendment Case'

RICHMOND (UPI) — Ex-CIA agent Frank W. Snepp III's freedom of expression takes precedence over the CIA's power to censor any information he might seek to publish about his experiences in the agency, Snepp's attorney has told a federal appeals court.

"The case doesn't involve secrecy, it doesn't involve stocks and trusts. It's a First Amendment case," Mark A. Lynch of the American Civil Liberties Union told the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.

But a government lawyer said the central issue in the case is the CIA's right to determine in advance whether information its employees seek to publish contains any official secrets.

Robert E. Kopp of the Justice Department argued that Snepp violated established principles of contract law when he disregarded his CIA oath by not submitting his book, "Decent Interval," to the agency for a review before publication.

AFTER AN HOUR of arguments yesterday, the three-judge panel took under consideration Snepp's appeal of his June conviction in Alexandria by U.S. District Judge Oren Lewis on charges of breaking his oath.

Lewis awarded the government all Snepp's profits from "Decent Interval," which attacked the CIA for abandoning loyal Vietnamese col-

laborators in the hasty U.S. evacuation of Saigon in 1975. He also enjoined Snepp from publishing any further information about the CIA without the agency's prior approval.

A spokesman for the ACLU said Snepp's case was certain to be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court no matter how the appeals court ruled. He also said he was optimistic that the court would overturn Lewis' injunction and the award to the government and might possibly send the case back to be heard by a jury.

In his appeal, Snepp alleged that Lewis improperly denied him a jury trial after ruling that the case involved only issues of law, not factual questions.

LYNCH ARGUED that a factual question was raised by inconsistencies between the oath of secrecy Snepp signed on entering the CIA in 1968 and the agreement he signed when leaving the agency in 1976.

He said the 1976 agreement, which bars Snepp from revealing any classified information without approval, superseded the 1968 oath, which covers all information about the intelligence agency.

Although the government has never alleged that Snepp's book contains any secrets, Kopp said Snepp had indicated he was aware he was barred from publishing any information without approval.

Article appeared
on page B-1

THE WASHINGTON POST
16 November 1978

RICHARD COHEN

From Contract Dispute To Censorship: Big Jump

HE SAID HER NAME was Marie. He said she was a woman of indeterminate age and limitless grace, a French woman in wartime Saigon with an American intelligence officer as a lover. The man who told me about her said she wore clinging black gauze-like shirts and red, bell-bottomed pants and she had golden blond hair, which was a rarity in Saigon. She wore it all as if she were making an offer. "Which she was," he said. He smiled. It would be dangerous to tell more.

I leaned forward at the table. Two other people were there, and all of us wanted to hear more. He shook his head. He could say no more. We could all get into trouble, he said, he for telling the story and me, probably, for writing it. He referred to the language of the injunction that forbids him from writing about his experiences as a CIA officer in Vietnam except under special circumstances. Frank Snepp smiled. At the moment, there is no way to publish the 23-page short story about the Saigon woman with golden blond hair. It would be illegal.

Frank Snepp is the former CIA officer who wrote a book about the fall of South Vietnam, where he was once stationed. The book is called "Decent Interval" and it charges that the CIA botched matters, that it deserted our one-time allies and abandoned our one-time employees. Having said that, you should not get the wrong idea about Snepp. He travels with the ACLU crowd now, but he is not of their persuasion. He is still an unreconstructed prowar type and when he asked me how come I didn't fight in Vietnam, he made it sound as if I had been hanging around playgrounds in a raincoat. Frank Snepp still believes.

Frank Snepp gives you problems. What the government says he should have done is submit his book manuscript to the CIA for clearance—to determine if there are any secrets in it. He did not. He had his reasons, but the fact is that he did not do what his contract seemed to require. Snepp now says that he didn't think he needed agency approval to publish the book, but that is not what he has said in the past.

In fact, Snepp made something of a production of how he beat the CIA, more or less giving it the finger. On television, for instance, he acknowledged that he broke his secrecy agreement (there were actually four) "in the sense of not turning my manuscript into the agency for clearance." Now Snepp says he never broke the agreement, that the last agreement he signed did not compel him to have the manuscript reviewed because the book contained no classified information. It's an argument he's entitled to make, but it shows, more than anything else, that he's been spending too much time with lawyers.

There is something in the Snepp case that rangles. There is something bothersome about a man breaking a contract, even a questionable contract, of determining for himself what is secret and what is not and then yelling for all the world how he got away with it. It makes the CIA look silly, makes it look like it can't enforce secrecy agreements. This was not the Central Intelligence Agency's finest hour.

So you can understand why the CIA would be peeved and the government a touch upset and you might even understand why it would want to slap his wrist. What they did was take him to court, contend they were severely injured, and win a judgment that compels Snepp to turn over all the book's proceeds to the government and forbids him from publishing anything—fiction or non-fiction—that stems from his experience as an intelligence officer without getting it cleared by the CIA. As a result, he can write nothing and publish nothing and accept none of the writing offers that come his way.

There is something almost medieval about the penalty. It has a stake-in-the-heart quality to it. They have taken Frank Snepp, who wrote a book because he felt he had to, because he had something to say, and they have said they own a piece of his life—his life experiences. They have said he can write nothing unless they clear it first and have said that I, or anyone else, cannot publish what he writes. They have done this even though there are no secrets in the book and there is a First Amendment to the Constitution and maybe the worst they can say for Snepp is that he made them squirm.

This is not to say that the government does not have its legitimate concern. The world is not simple and there are secrets that have to be kept and men who, probably, would not keep them. Snepp is not that man and this is not the proper solution. What is needed here is a new law, not some sort of judicial concoction that poisons everything, that was supposed to remedy a contract dispute and instead winds up burying, in a fashion, a short story that is the product of a man's experience and his imagination. Once that story was about a woman with golden hair.

Now it's about government censorship.



Article appeared
on page C-8

THE WASHINGTON POST
16 November 1978

ACLU Celebrates Its Veterans

By Carla Hall

Roger Baldwin, 95, founder of the American Civil Liberties Union, dressed in business suit gray took a sip of his Manhattan and declared that he had never had a fight in his life.

"I came to the conclusion a long time ago that I wouldn't participate in violence," he announced in a firm tone. "I never hit anybody in my life and never was hit in my life. I was always that way from the time I was a small boy. I was always a pacifist."

So when a reporter asked Baldwin last night at the ACLU's Henry W. Edgerton Annual Dinner at the Washington Hilton—where he was honored with a testimonial salute—why he started the American Civil Liberties Union, he raised his eyebrows and said, "Oh, we had to. The war was on."

What he started after World War I was declared and after he himself had served a year in jail for refusing to serve was a civil liberties union for people who "needed defense and needed lawyers."

The dinner was a gathering of so many "old and new liberals," many of whom had worked together in various pursuits that Sterling Tucker, D.C. City Council chairman, said it was like "old home week."

In the past 50-plus years, the ACLU has lobbied for or legally defended those whose civil rights were felt to be violated, including both blacks and the Ku Klux Klan. "Well, we tried to defend the KKK," said Baldwin, "but they wouldn't accept our lawyers. They were suspicious."

But Frank Snepp, the former CIA agent whose book about the agency a court has declared violated his contract with the agency, accepted the ACLU's help recently in his appeal of the decision.

"Have you been vindicated yet?" asked Baldwin with a smile as he stopped at the dinner to speak with Snepp.

"It's difficult to rally liberal support, because I'm from the CIA," said Snepp. "It takes a great leap of faith for the ACLU to support me. But they're very concerned about the First Amendment implications of this case and they've rallied to my side. If the ACLU had not picked up this case I'd be in difficult straits. The money I may get (when this case is settled) will be devoted to helping the ACLU."

The ACLU awarded plaques to three people instrumental in pushing the resolutions for full voting rights for the District of Columbia through the House and the Senate—Del. Walter Fauntroy, who introduced the bill in the House, Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), who was not there, and Rep. Don Edwards (D-Calif.).

It also gave an award to Hoover Rowel, a gardener at the National Institutes of Health, who was one of 15 gardeners who filed a suit 15 years ago claiming that NIH discriminated against black gardeners. The suit was settled out of court only last year, and the ACLU, which represented the gardeners, awarded Rowel for his perseverance and fortitude.

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PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
17 NOVEMBER 1978

National



Frank W. Shepp 3d.

A former CIA agent did not violate a secrecy agreement, his attorney says.

The attorney for Frank W. Shepp 3d, author of the book "Decent Interval," said the agreement that Shepp signed when he left the CIA in 1976 merely prohibited him from writing about classified material. Mark Lynch, a lawyer with the American Civil Liberties Union, said that even the U.S. government had conceded that the book, which criticizes the CIA's operations in Vietnam, contained no classified information. Shepp is appealing a District Court ruling that denies him any profits from the book, which was published last year, and orders him to clear all CIA-related material with the agency before any future publication.

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CARBONDALE SOUTHERN ILLINOISAN

24 October 1978

Harvard trustees have right to ban secret CIA recruitment

CIA DIRECTOR Stansfield Turner is wrong in challenging the right of Harvard University to control recruitment activities among students and faculty.

Harvard's trustees recently banned the CIA from quietly recruiting foreign students.

Turner's reaction was blunt: "If we were required to abide by the rules of every corporation, every academic institution, it would become impossible to do the required job for our country. Harvard does not have any legal authority over us."

That is true enough. But Harvard does have the responsibility, as do other universities, to control access to university property and to establish policies to foster trust and openness within the academic community.

Secret recruitment of students, whether foreign or American, would tend to diminish this bond of faith among faculty and students. Even the suspicion of a spy in the neighborhood would hurt.

Their interest in foreign students dealt more with foreign than domestic operations, which, theoretically at least, are prohibited by law.

Their hope is that foreign students eventually will occupy important positions in their governments, giving the CIA access to secret information in the years ahead.

Along the way foreign students, once on the CIA payroll, are likely to pass along bits of gossip about other students, faculty and administrators, information which will be slipped quietly to the CIA computers.

As a practical matter, it's unlikely that Harvard or any other university is equipped to prevent the CIA from slipping into Harvard Yard to recruit agents.

Yet Turner's defiance of the Harvard trustees suggests, if nothing else, that the CIA has lost little of its arrogance, despite the scandals of recent years.

Cutting away the flamboyant rhetoric, Turner is telling us what past directors have said -- the CIA knows what is best for the rest of us.

President Carter, or the Senate Intelligence Committee should tell Turner to respect the Harvard trustees and work around the ban without violating Harvard's authority.

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
5 November 1978

CIA Subversion

Stansfield Turner, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has taken the incredible position that his agency will not be bound by rules designed to maintain standards of integrity in either academic or other institutions. The CIA's position was stated in response to Harvard University guidelines stipulating, among other things, that no member of the university faculty was to engage in covert activities for the CIA, that no faculty member was to serve as a recruiter for the CIA without the professor's name being on public file at the university's placement office and that the names of potential recruits in the university community were not to be given to the CIA without the individual's permission.

These rules had actually been promulgated by Harvard at the suggestion of the Senate Intelligence Committee after the panel had found threats to academic freedom in the CIA's campus activities but had declined to propose statutory restrictions. A Harvard committee that proposed the rules had concluded that:

"... The existence on the Harvard campus of unidentified individuals who may be probing the views of others and obtaining information for the possible use of the CIA is inconsistent with the idea of a free and independent university. Such practices inhibit free discourse and are a distortion of the relationship that should exist among members of an academic community."

Not only has the CIA been using academics for covert operations and secret recruiting in over 100 U.S. institutions but it has also been conducting background investigations of potential recruits before they even knew they were being considered. Regardless of rules to the contrary, Mr. Turner proposes to continue subversion of academia so that the CIA supposedly can do its job. The only answer now seems to be for Congress to put a stop to it.

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BALTIMORE SUN
17 NOVEMBER 1978

Washington

GARRY WILLS had an article in *The Sun*, November 1, entitled, "The CIA and the Press." In it he critiqued a speech I had given a few days before at the National Press Club. It would appear that Mr. Wills wrote from a second-hand report.

The basic issue is a comparison between the desire of the press to

By Stansfield Turner

preserve the secrecy of its sources of information and the desire of the CIA to do the same. Mr. Wills states quite blatantly that the CIA wants not only to protect its sources but to hide its wrongdoings. I vehemently deny this, but more importantly I refer Mr. Wills to the portion of my speech on oversight.

I clearly pointed out that no matter what motives you impute to myself and others in the leadership of the Central Intelligence Agency, we are today under very rigorous oversight from both the executive and legislative branches of our government. Mr. Wills and any citizen have good assurance from the oversight process that secrecy will not be abused.

It Looks As If Mr. Wills Wrote from Second Hand

Next, Mr. Wills expressly says that I said "reporters should not print the leaks of wrongdoing in government by whistleblowers." I said nothing of the sort and refer you to my text: I only said that we should be suspect of whistleblowers who don't resort to the established oversight procedures before disclosing government secrets to the press and that the members of the press might do well to be skeptical themselves of many whistleblowers. I have in many public speeches affirmed my conviction that a number of whistleblowers in recent years have provided a great service to our country.

In his final paragraph, Mr. Wills states the thesis that protecting sources so that ultimately newsmen will be able to publish more facts is necessarily and always laudable; whereas protecting sources so as not to reveal government secrets is always necessarily bad. This simplistic thesis has no logic to support it, nor would the people of this country support the view that protecting such information as our nation's communication codes, our negotiating positions in matters of trade, tariffs or arms limitation, or any number of other national concerns may not be equally or more important to our national well-being.

I close with the suggestion and hope that should Mr. Wills have any evidence or suspicion of cover-up, wrongdoing or impropriety by me or anyone in the intelligence community, that he make those suspicions known to the Intelligence Oversight Board, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. I can assure him that all three bodies will thoroughly investigate any such information he wishes to make available.

Mr. Turner is director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Can the CIA Director Read?

I PRESUME Admiral Turner is able to read. Does he refrain from doing so on principle, or just from the press of business? Far from saying that protection of news sources "is

By Garry Wills

necessarily and always laudable," I repeated in my column what I have often said in print, that I think the *New York Times's* refusal [in the case of reporter Myron Farber] to release possible evidence in a murder trial is not necessarily laudable.

Admiral Turner says whistleblowers should be treated warily by the

press (they have been), and that internal correction should first be looked to (it normally is). Whistleblowing occurs when the system is not self-correcting. To attack the present wary treatment of whistleblowers is to ask, in effect, that they not be encouraged or their information never be printed. That is the real point of Admiral Turner's "comparison between the desire of the press to preserve the secrecy of its sources of information and the desire of the CIA to do the same"—since the *Times* said it would not release its sources at all.

I said that protection of sources should be judged very differently in a process whose aim is eventual publication of facts (as the press's must

be) and one whose aim is maintenance of secrets (as the CIA's must be). Comparing the two situations is like saying the man who refuses information to a murderer is the same as the man who refuses information to a rescuer—they are both just refusing information.

Admiral Turner refers to the text of his speech; but it was in the question period that he said he could see "no difference" in the cases of the *Times* protecting sources and the CIA protecting secrets. I presume Admiral Turner is able to see. Does he refrain from doing so on principle, or just from the press of business?

Mr. Wills, who teaches at the Johns Hopkins University, writes a syndicated column.

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WASHINGTON STAR
10 NOVEMBER 1978

U.S. Asks Ruling to Guard Secrets at Trials

United Press International

In a case likely to have far-reaching impact, the Justice Department has asked an appeals court to approve special procedures to protect and limit disclosure of national security secrets during criminal trials.

The petition for writ of mandamus, filed yesterday with the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, sought to overturn a lower court judge's refusal to bar defense lawyers from exposing intelligence secrets during the perjury trial of an ITT officer.

Prosecutors have indicated they probably will drop their case against Robert Berrellez, accused of covering up the International Telephone and Telegraph Corp.'s attempts to influence Chile's 1970 election, if they cannot obtain a protective order.

AT ISSUE IS the conflict between a defendant's constitutional right to a fair, public trial and the government's need to protect sensitive national security information.

The government appeal of U.S. District Judge Aubrey Robinson's ruling seeks to set up a three-step procedure under which "highly sensitive" material could be declared irrelevant during criminal trials without being made public.

A judge would first review

camera" the government's documentation of its reasons for seeking a protective order. If satisfied of the need, he would issue an order to "require the defense and all witnesses to alert the court at any stage of the trial when material within the categories set forth in the protective order was about to be disclosed."

In each instance, the judge would then conduct a closed-door hearing to "determine the relevance" of the material to the trial.

IF THE MATERIAL was declared relevant, "the government can weigh whether to allow public disclosure or dismiss the prosecution," the petition says.

It also asks the appeals court to rule that national security information not directly related to the charges or "a legally cognizable defense" cannot be admitted as evidence.

It also seeks to bar admissibility of evidence if government agents induced a defendant into taking criminal actions.

Top Justice Department officials say growing numbers of criminal cases are involving defendants familiar with CIA secrets or other sensitive information. Attorney General Griffin Bell said the problem made

prosecution difficult in three recent espionage trials and also could affect the upcoming trial of former FBI director L. Patrick Gray and two of his top aides.

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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
15 November 1978

Saving CIA secrecy

By Stansfield Turner

From recent remarks by the Director of Central Intelligence at the National Press Club in Washington.

How will openness help us preserve secrets? Well, simply by reducing the excessive corpus of secrets that now exists within our government. Today so much information is unnecessarily classified that we have lost respect for the classified label. By making as much as possible available to the public, we reduce the amount that is kept secret. In turn this makes it easier to engender respect for that which remains classified.

It has become very suspect these days to even refer to withholding information in the name of national security. Abuse of this principle in the past, however, does not make it invalid today. Quite simply, there is information which it is not in the national interest to disclose. We cannot negotiate a SALT treaty if we cannot maintain the privacy of our negotiating position. We cannot afford to develop expensive weapons systems or devices for collecting intelligence and then tell those against whom we might have to employ them what their precise characteristics are.

Because, however, we in the world of intelligence are in the risk-taking business, and because there are dangers to our national fabric from the improper use of the intelligence process, clearly there must be special checks on us. I believe that there are such checks today and that the public can be more confident today than ever before that the abuses of the past will not reoccur.

We have established a thorough system of control mechanisms to govern our day-by-day activities. These start with two basic guidelines which are the framework within which all intelligence professionals now work. The first of these is that espionage must be considered an extraordinary remedy. Clandestine means of gathering information should never be utilized when the same information might be available openly. The second guideline is that actions which we take in secret must be defensible, in principle, in public.

Some activities, such as assassination, are so repugnant to our national standards as to warrant prohibition without exception. In some cases, however, total prohibition is a bit too rigid a position. Instead, we have injunctions which generally prohibit certain activities unless there is a specific authorization for them.

The most significant change in American intelligence in recent years, however, and one that is truly revolutionary is the introduction of effective external oversight from both the executive and legislative branches.

The congressional oversight committees are now in the process of legislating guidelines, prohibitions, and injunctions and further refining the oversight procedures themselves in what will be known as charters for the intelligence community. I strongly support this undertaking. In the first place it will provide the legal foundation for our activities. In the second place, it will provide guidance so that the US intelligence officer on the street in a foreign country and those of us in the headquarters will have a better idea of what is expected, what may not be done and what, if done, must be justified convincingly to our overseers.

I hope that you will recognize that when we balk, for instance, at disclosing all the secrets necessary to prosecute a case in court, we do not do so in an arbitrary manner. We study these cases very carefully. Moreover, we must be prepared to justify our positions not only to the Attorney General but to our oversight committees. How many so-called "whistle blowers" go through the oversight mechanisms that I have described where abuses and undue secrecy can be questioned without compromising legitimate secrets? I am suspicious as to their motivation and suggest that you might well be also. Further, when every elected or appointed public official is suspect and every renegade whistle blower is automatically accepted as a hero; when there is greater emphasis on criticizing and tearing down our society than on building it up, I suggest that we are heading for real trouble.